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FITTING AN OLD TIGER WITH NEW
TEETH: PROTECTING PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE FUNDS INVESTING IN
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
RICHARD E. MENDALES

*

State employee benefit funds invested heavily in complex financial
instruments before the crash of 2008. These investments were tempting to
the funds because the instruments carried higher yields than those offered
by traditional securities in the low interest climate created largely by
Federal Reserve policies after the turn of the century. The risks of the
unconventional securities were concealed by investment-grade ratings
issued by credit rating agencies and by deceptive marketing practices.
With the crash, funds incurred major losses, which, unlike losses by
private funds, are not insured by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation.
This Article deals both with enforcing claims based on deceptive
practices, and protecting funds against future investments of this kind.
Enforcement is an issue because the SEC has limited resources, though it
faces fewer procedural burdens than the states, and is the only party with
standing to bring actions under statutes such as the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940. Enforcement by states acting alone is problematic because
most states have limited experience in securities litigation, and because
they may proceed under state law, risking divergent outcomes that could
undermine the consistency in dealing with securities fraud intended by the
federal securities laws.
This Article proposes that the SEC create within itself an Office of
State Coordination to help train state legal personnel in securities fraud
actions, and to enable the SEC to coordinate enforcement with state

* Associate Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law. Supreme Court Fellow, 1999–
2000. J.D., Yale Law School, 1981; M.A., University of Chicago, 1970; B.A., University of
Chicago, 1969. I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at the Charleston School of
Law and elsewhere for their patience and suggestions concerning drafts of this Article. All
errors, of course, are my own.
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agencies in order to maximize the effectiveness of limited enforcement
resources. Next, it discusses protecting benefit funds in future investments
and analyzes the provisions of the new Dodd-Frank Act intended to
improve the securities rating process, finding them to be largely
ineffective. It therefore recommends largely bypassing Dodd-Frank, and
giving earlier securities laws new teeth through regulatory changes
restricting the sale of unregistered securities to larger, more sophisticated
funds. It also recommends extending the SEC’s “Plain English”
disclosure rules—now applicable only to registered securities—to all
securities offerings. These rules require issuers to disclose the risks of the
instruments they offer in plain English and in order of the magnitude of
the risks they pose. Thus, these rules would provide better guides to risk
than the rating system, even as modified by Dodd-Frank, and will aid
states both in regulating investments by their funds and in enforcement
actions against deceptive practices.
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INTRODUCTION

The financial panic that began almost invisibly late in 2006 spread,
like an epidemic, from largely unregulated organizations such as hedge
funds to supposedly regulated institutions such as securities dealers and
1
banks. It has now reached beyond that circle to strike at sovereign
nations and, within the United States, at institutions deeply embedded
2
in the fabric of society such as public employee benefit funds. Benefit
funds face a continuing threat similar in nature to that already
experienced by other financial institutions on Wall Street. During the
years preceding the crisis, the entities administering the benefit funds
invested heavily in complex financial instruments that they did not
understand, and which, when the crisis hit, proved to be worth far less
than their cost, or proved to be impossible to value and therefore
3
impossible to sell.
Public benefit funds are also threatened because the states and
municipal entities that sponsor them have not made adequate
4
contributions to support their future obligations. This is chiefly a
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION passim (2009); James R. Barth et al., The Financial Crisis: How
Did We Get Here and Where Do We Go Next?, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 95, 97–98, 100 (Robert W. Kolb
ed., 2010) (noting that the wave of foreclosures that ended the subprime housing boom began
in 2006). Judge Richard A. Posner, writing in 2009, described the worldwide financial crisis
that climaxed in 2008 with the crash of global financial markets following the failure of the
noted investment banking firms of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers as having sufficient
magnitude to be described as a “depression” without parallel since the Crash of 1929 and the
Great Depression that followed. See POSNER supra.
2. The term “benefit fund” will be used generically for purposes of this Article to cover
trust funds established by states and their instrumentalities, including municipalities, school
boards, and similar entities, for the welfare of their employees. These include old age and
disability pensions, medical benefit plans, and other similar funds.
3. See Gretchen Morgenson, Wall Street’s Tax on Main Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011,
at BU1 (municipalities and benefit funds face financial ruin not only because of benefit
obligations and weak revenues, but because of investment in financial instruments they do
not understand and whose downside is not adequately disclosed to them); Louise Story, A
Question of Value: What’s an Asset Worth? It’s Not Always Easy to Tell, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2008, at C1 (outlining that “one of most vexing problems” facing Wall Street, even before the
crash of 2008, was how to value securities backed by subprime mortgages).
4. See Meredith Whitney, Opinion, The Hidden State Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., May
18, 2011, at A17; David Evans, Banks Sell ‘Toxic Waste’ CDOs to Calpers, Texas Teachers
Fund, BLOOMBERG (June 1, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aW5vEJn3LpVw; see also Morgenson, supra note 3 (discussing the recent bankruptcy
filing by Central Falls, Rhode Island).
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political problem, although it is linked to the securities law issues that
are the primary subject of this Article, because the fund administrators
are under intense pressure from beneficiaries and political officials to
make up for insufficient contributions. As a result, the administrators
have made improvident investments to obtain unrealistically high yields
5
on their assets. Most public pension funds, for example, still base
required employee contributions and promised benefits on assumed
returns of 7% to 8%, while actual yields have been 5% to 7% since the
6
turn of the century, and less since the crash of 2008. During the period
preceding the crash, fiduciaries for plans invested in securities based on
high ratings and promises by issuers that the securities they were buying
7
offered safety as well as high yields. Given the broad distinction
8
between the political problems involved in funding public benefit funds,
and the threats they face from defaults of allegedly safe instruments, this
Article will focus primarily on the latter, dealing with issues arising
under the securities laws.
Public benefit funds face problems that differ significantly from
those faced by their private counterparts. One important distinction is
that qualifying private benefit funds are regulated by the Federal
9
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which ultimately
provides at least partial compensation to its beneficiaries, should they
10
prove insolvent. The federal Employee Retirement Income Security
11
Act (ERISA) and the regulations adopted thereunder have given these

5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 85, 97–103 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan & John Eligon, In Albany, Plan to Cut Pensions Takes
Shape; Redistricting Moves Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A26 (discussing the bitter
political battle over modifications in public pension contributions and benefits). Benefit
funds face strong opposition to modifications in required contributions, benefits, and other
changes concerning their beneficiaries by the beneficiaries themselves and their
representatives such as public employee unions and allied political forces. See id.
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4002, 88
Stat. 829, 1004 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1302 (2006)). The PBGC was
established by ERISA in 1974. See id.
10. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2006).
11. § 4002, 88 Stat. at 1004. ERISA covers both qualifying private pension and health
benefit plans, and mandates supervision of funding and investments for such plans, inter alia,
by the Federal Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, and the PBGC. See
History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
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funds substantial protection from abuses by financial intermediaries
peddling risky financial instruments, although this protection has not
12
been perfect.
Ironically, benefit funds operated by states and their subdivisions
are at greater risk. They are largely exempt from investment standards
13
mandated by ERISA and PBGC insurance, and they were afforded
minimal protection from federal statutes and regulations until the
enactment, after the financial crisis had already taken its toll, of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd14
Frank Act). It is not surprising, therefore, that problems are coming to
light concerning the value of securities held by this large class of benefit
15
funds, which present state governments with the risk of defaulting on
securities they hold, in addition to underfunding based on loss of state
16
revenues due to the continuing national financial crisis. Because major
insolvencies at the state level could adversely impact the credit of the
17
country as a whole, large-scale insolvency of state and local benefit

12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). The sharp distinction between ERISA-based claims and
those brought by public benefit funds is illustrated by the separate settlement by public
benefit funds in the Stipulation of Settlement of Securities Action from Ohio Public
Employees Retirement System v. Freddie Mac, MDL No. 1584, No. 03-CV-4261 (S.D.N.Y.
May 23, 2006) (public benefit funds agreed to settlement of securities class action, stipulating
it did not apply to related ERISA class action cases because the actions by public benefit
funds relied solely on the securities laws, because they were not subject to protective
provisions of ERISA).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
15. See 2008 State & Local Public-Employee Retirement Systems, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(May 15, 2012), http://www.census.gov/govs/retire/historical_data_2008.html. U.S. Census
data show that there were about 2,550 state and local benefit funds holding about $2.2 trillion
in total assets—about one-third of all assets held in U.S. benefit funds—as of June 30, 2008,
just before the financial crisis reached its peak. Rules of Registration of Municipal Advisers,
Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-63576, 76 Fed. Reg. 824, 826 (proposed Jan. 6, 2011) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
16. See infra note 64–66 and accompanying note.
17. Contagion from the failure of major financial entities often has effects that can
spread throughout a national economy or even the rest of the world, particularly when the
national or world economy is already in fragile condition. The failure of Lehman Brothers
was such an event and helped precipitate the worldwide financial crisis of 2008. See infra
notes 207, 214–21 and accompanying text. Another example is the threatened default of
Greece, which, despite the relatively small size of the Greek economy, threatens to cause a
chain reaction to larger economies such as Spain and Italy, and thence to the entire Eurozone
and from there to countries outside the Eurozone. See Rachel Donadio & Liz Alderman,
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funds could lead to a financial meltdown comparable to the threatened
failure of private financial institutions that brought on the 2008 crisis,
and hence could require federal intervention despite the lack of formal
18
insurance coverage by ERISA and PBGC under present law.
During the decade leading to the present financial crisis, benefit
funds tremendously increased their exposure to risky investments,
19
particularly in the form of complex asset-backed securities. The funds
that proved vulnerable to the peddling of these financial instruments—
often deceptively marketed as offering safety in addition to high yield—
20
include not only smaller and less sophisticated funds but also large and
supposedly sophisticated funds such as the California Public Employees’
21
Retirement System (CALPERS) and the Teacher Retirement System
22
of Texas. These funds experienced pressure from their beneficiaries
and political officials to obtain higher rates of return on their
23
investments, at a time when the prevailing low interest rates depressed
yields on conventional investments to levels that made it more difficult

Talks Under Way to Form a Government in Greece, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2012, at A8;
Eurozone Crisis Explained, BBC NEWS: BUS. (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/bus
iness-13798000. This is not a new phenomenon; the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, for
example, with its direct effects on the national economy and indirect effects on insurance
companies worldwide, helped precipitate the Panic of 1907 and resulting global financial
crisis. See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 13 (2007).
18. See Whitney, supra note 4 (noting that state budget shortfalls, including partly
hidden underfunding of pension and other employee obligations, could threaten the national
recovery, since state spending makes up 12% of the United States’ gross domestic product).
19. See Rules of Registration of Municipal Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. at 825–26; Christopher
Whalen, Yield to Commission: Is an OTC Market to Blame for Growing Systemic Risk?, J.
STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2008, at 8, 8; Evans, supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., SEC Hearing on the State of Municipal Securities Market, Birmingham, AL
(2011) (prepared remarks of Andrew Kalotay), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/muni
cipalsecurities/statements072911/kalotay.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Michael B. Marois, Calpers Strips LaSalle of Industrial Real Estate
Portfolio, Adds GI, RREEF, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2
010-12-01/calpers-strips-lasalle-of-industrial-real-estate-portfolio-job.html (noting that the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System is the largest state-run public employees’
pension fund in the United States).
22. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 4.
23. See Yes, They Can Go Down Too, ECONOMIST (May 13, 2007, 10:35 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/03/yes_they_can_go_down_too (noting
that the Dallas Police and Fire Pension Funds bought high-risk CDOs to boost rates of
return).
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24

to fund potential claims for pension, and other, benefits.
The turkeys are now coming home to roost for benefit funds that
bought risky instruments that have defaulted or sharply diminished in
25
value. Faced with steep losses, some have commenced lawsuits against
the financial advisers and institutions that sold and rated the risky
26
Both the transactions leading to these cases and the
investments.
process of resolving them lead back to major holes in the federal
statutes and regulations that supposedly protect investors against
27
misrepresentations and manipulative conduct in the sale of securities.
One of these deficiencies, the exclusion of public funds from ERISA
coverage, would require significant new federal legislation to
28
overcome. Given the issues of federalism that this would raise, and the
present highly partisan political climate—which seems likely to persist
into the indefinite future—the burden of overcoming resistance to such
29
legislation appears insuperable as of this writing.
24. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 4 (noting that the problems with pension funds are
similar to Orange County’s 1994 bankruptcy at which time“[t]he county was earning 8 percent
in what was a 3 1/2 percent world”).
25. See John Ryan, The Greenspan and Bernanke Federal in the Reserve Roles in the
Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 461, 461–62 (noting that interest rates set by the
Federal Reserve help dictate interest rates across the entire economy, and in particular led to
low mortgage interest rates that fed the housing bubble).
26. See Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 814 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(suit by pension fund against financial adviser seeking $1.2 billion after default of CDOs sold
to pension system); Complaint, Illinois v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. 12 CH-02535 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 25, 2012) (suit by State of Illinois against Standard & Poor’s seeking compensation for
deceptive practices in rating asset-backed securities).
27. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
28. ERISA specifically excludes “governmental plans” from coverage. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b)(1) (2006). Government plans include plans for federal employees and those of
state governments, agencies, and instrumentalities, as well as those of international
organizations, and Indian tribes. Id. § 1002(32). This is in part because the stated purpose of
ERISA is to protect employees covered by private benefit plans from abuses, Id. § 1001(a)–
(c), and in part because Congress based its authority to enact ERISA in part on the taxing
power, id. § 1001(c), a power that raises questions of federalism when applied to the states, as
seen in the exemption of interest on the obligations of states and their instrumentalities from
taxation. See 26 U.S.C. § 115(1) (2006). In any event, the extension of federal authority to
states and their instrumentalities appears to be particularly difficult at this time, when any
extension of federal authority faces steep roadblocks in Congress, and possibly in the courts
as well. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
713–15 (1999) (holding that states retain sovereignty where not limited by Constitutional
authority of the federal government).
29. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN
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This Article therefore suggests that new rules dealing with securities
sold to public benefit funds—both for sales before the financial crisis
and for protection against new abuses in the post-crisis world—should
focus upon the peddlers of complex financial instruments rather than on
the benefit funds they have victimized. To provide a unified federal
structure of protection, this approach necessarily will rely largely on
regulations based on the securities laws. As we shall see, the Dodd30
Frank Act, and regulations being drafted to implement Dodd-Frank,
31
will not suffice for this purpose.
These measures are inadequate for several reasons. First, Dodd32
Frank is so large, complex, and riddled with legislative compromises
that the agencies charged with enforcing it, which have been
systematically underfunded by Congress, have had to delay their
drafting of interpretive regulations well beyond the deadlines set by the
33
statute. Moreover, Dodd-Frank continues to face legislative hostility
IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012). The new study concludes that the Republican Party in
Congress has been taken over by ideological extremists determined and able to obstruct any
measure—especially regulatory actions—contrary to their anti-government philosophy. Id. at
XIV. The book’s claims to non-partisanship are supported by Ornstein’s membership in the
Republican-oriented American Enterprise Institute. See Norman J. Ornstein: Resident
Scholar, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, http://www.aei.org/scholar/norman-j-ornstein/
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
30. See SEC’s Dodd-Frank Act Implementation Efforts Continue, FIN. SERVS. INST.
(Oct. 20, 2010), https://www.financialservices.org/page.aspx?id=2886.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.B–E.
32. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lawmakers Seek Shortcut in Negotiating Housing Bill,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2008, at D1 (detailing numerous comprises made by congress prior to
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act); David Cho et al., Lawmakers Guide Wall Street Reform
into Homestretch, WASH. POST, June 26, 2010, at A1.
33. See Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2012: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov’t Appropriations of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 112th Cong. 109–17 (2011) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission); Arthur Levitt Jr., Op-Ed., Don’t Gut the S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at A19. Full implementation of Dodd-Frank for FY 2012 required about
780 new SEC staff, see id., and an increase in funding of $264 million from FY 2011, U.S. SEC.
EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2 (2011). But the SEC
received an increase of $178 million, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 11274, 125 Stat. 786, 920 (2011) ($1.321 billion budget for FY 2012), $86 million short of the
SEC’s $1.407 billion goal for FY 2012. See U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra. The Senate
Appropriations Committee recently passed a $1.566 billion budget for the SEC in FY 2013,
however, it is unclear whether this budget will be appropriated. See Yin Wilczek, ExCommissioners Say SEC Now Facing Biggest Rulemaking Crunch in Agency History, 44 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1338 (July 9, 2012); Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Senate Panel OKs
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that is likely to make agencies tread carefully in drafting regulations to
34
implement it. In addition, it virtually excludes enforcement actions by
parties other than regulatory agencies such as the Securities and
35
Exchange Commission (SEC). This is a major weakness because, as is
true for other actions by the SEC and other regulatory agencies, the
number of professionals available for federal enforcement falls far short
of the number required to deal with the securities law violations
36
involved in the crisis. Although Dodd-Frank provides for the creation
of an annual $100 million reserve fund for the SEC, financed by
37
registration fees paid to the Commission, the House Appropriations
Committee, displaying open hostility toward Dodd-Frank and the SEC
itself, has sought to nullify the statute by both barring the creation of
such a fund in bills making appropriations for the SEC, and by reducing
38
its appropriations well below levels sought by the Executive Branch.
Budget Boosts for SEC, CFTC, REUTERS (June 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/201
2/06/14/us-senate-cftc-sec-funding-idUSBRE85D1HJ20120614; supra note 32; infra note 38, et
seq. and accompanying text.
34. See R. Christian Bruce, Wolin Defends Administration’s Efforts On Dodd-Frank,
Vows to Oppose Repeal, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 868 (Apr. 25, 2011); Levitt,
supra note 33 (noting that deliberate underfunding by Congressional Republicans has
impaired the ability of agencies to draft regulations to enforce Dodd-Frank); Wilczek, supra
note 33.
35. See infra notes 282–83 and accompanying text.
36. See Stephen J. Crimmins, New SEC Enforcement Unit Focuses on Funds and
Advisers, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 47, at 2284 (Dec. 6 2010) (noting that the SEC
Enforcement Division has “limited resources,” and that the new unit to enforce Investment
Advisers Act will comprise only 65 professionals, including both lawyers and accountants).
As early as 1963, the SEC advised the Supreme Court in an amicus brief that it lacked
sufficient personnel to carefully examine the 2,000 proxy statements submitted to it annually,
a number that has multiplied many times since then. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964). The lack of sufficient personnel not only prevents the agency (and other agencies
involved in enforcement such as the CFTC) from bringing enforcement actions in many cases,
but has forced the SEC to accept settlements that fail to bring about full disgorgement
payments made in transactions violating the securities laws even if the accused wrongdoers,
even if subject to injunctions for prior violations, are not required to admit wrongdoing. See,
e.g., Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an S.E.C. Deal with Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011,
at A1.
37. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(i)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011) (noting that the
maximum amount that can be deposited per fiscal year is $50 million, while the maximum
balance the account can hold is $100 million per fiscal year).
38. See James Hamilton, House Financial Services Appropriations Bill Would Eliminate
SEC Reserve Fund, CCH FIN. REFORM NEWS CTR. (June 16, 2011), http://financialreform.wo
lterskluwerlb.com/2011/06/house-financial-services-appropriations-bill-would-eliminate-secreserve-fund.html. The partisan hostility to the SEC was illustrated by the Committee’s
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Congressional failure to fund the SEC at levels required by law has
crippled the agency not only in its ability to recruit badly needed new
personnel and to conduct enforcement actions, but even to engage in
39
routine examinations, both at the national and at the local levels.
Other federal regulatory agencies, such as the Commodities Futures
40
Trading Commission (CFTC), have also suffered Congressional
cutbacks, but attacks on the SEC have special impact because the SEC
has been the spearhead of federal enforcement of antifraud statutes and
41
regulations.
Therefore, recovery of losses will require measures to enhance the
effectiveness of the SEC as presently staffed, and to aid the states in
acting on behalf of their benefit funds. While some statutory changes of
recent years, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
42
(PSLRA), have created impediments to actions by parties other than

statement, notwithstanding the creation of the fund by Dodd-Frank that would be “a slush
fund for the SEC for programs that have not been approved by Congress.” See House
Appropriations Bill Funds SEC at $1.2B, $222M Less than Obama Request, 43 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 25, at 1273 (June 20, 2011). This hostility continues. See Administration
‘Strongly Opposes’ House Bill to Set SEC’s FY 2013 Budget at $1.371B, 44 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1334 (July 9, 2012) (noting that the House Appropriations Committee
cleared H.R. 6020, setting 2013 appropriations for the SEC $195 million less than requested
by the White House, and barring the SEC from using its $50 million reserve fund).
39. See Stephen Joyce, Absence of Self-Funding Presents SEC with Big Challenge,
Regional Chief Says, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 27, 2011); Stephen Joyce, Budget
Deficiencies Leading to Change in SEC Examination Process, Canellos Says, SEC. L. DAILY
(BNA) (Nov. 22, 2011) (short funding by Congress pushing the SEC to change its
examination process “to focus on alleged wrongdoing at the expense of conducting more
prudential exams”).
40. See Charles Riley, Broken Budget Process Hurts Wall Street Reform, CNNMONEY
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/10/news/economy/cftc_sec_budget/index.htm
(noting that Congressional Republicans blocked higher appropriations for CFTC and SEC as
part of their general opposition to implementing Dodd-Frank).
41. SEC understaffing has long forced the agency to accept settlements with financial
institutions accused of securities violations in which, even in cases of repeat violations, the
targets of its actions have been able to avoid any admissions of specific acts of wrongdoing.
See, e.g., Wyatt, supra note 36 (noting that a study by The New York Times showed fifty-one
instances in which the SEC accepted settlements with companies that had previously agreed
to injunctions not to commit similar infractions). Settlements of this kind not only result in
inadequate compensation of the victims of securities violations through agency action but also
leave such victims with no court record on which to base their own actions against the
offenders.
42. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 and 78 (2006)) [hereinafter PSLRA].
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43

the SEC, the changes have had a penumbral effect beyond their actual
language in deterring private counsel for benefit funds from undertaking
44
actions in the federal courts, even though the funds are expressly
45
exempt from the obstacles posed by the PSLRA, and its parallel
46
statute, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA),
which enables defendants in private securities fraud class actions
brought in state courts to remove them to federal court, where they can
47
be dismissed without discovery under the PSLRA.
To overcome these problems, the SEC should act to keep securities
regulation within a framework centered on federal securities law. In
view of the partisan deadlock that now besets Congress and is likely to

43. The PSLRA was passed with the alleged intent to prevent abusive private class
actions under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See id. It did so, inter
alia, by raising the pleading requirements that plaintiffs must meet in order to obtain
discovery from defendants. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2006) [hereinafter Exchange Act]; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308
(2007).
44. PSLRA, Sec. 101(a), § 27(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c) (2006); Andrew J. Entwistle &
Jonathan H. Beemer, Approaches to Asset Recovery for Pension Fund Subprime Exposure,
NAPPA REPORT, Feb. 2008, at 4, 4–6 (2008), available at http://www.entwistlelaw.com/news/publications/000041/_res/id=sa_File1/Approaches%20to%20Asset.pdf. Part of
this effect is probably due not only to the standards imposed for bringing actions, but to
sanctions that the PSLRA imposes for allegedly abusive actions under the Exchange Act,
which may have a deterrent effect on private attorneys representing benefit funds who are
subject to the sanctions in bringing actions on behalf of private plaintiffs. See Exchange Act
§ 21D(c). In fact, however, recent decisions indicate that the PSLRA is having adverse
effects on actions by benefit funds—not intended targets of the statute—under the federal
securities laws—and increasingly pushing them into state court. See, e.g., Mississippi Pub.
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 78 (1st Cir. 2008) (reversing district
court dismissal under PSLRA). Even a large private entity such as AIG, in a securities-based
action against two private investment firms, chose to bring the action under state law in New
York even though it could have had its case heard in federal court based on facts pleaded in a
parallel action by the SEC. See Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. ICP Asset Mgmt., No. 10-cv-04791
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Complaint at 1–2, AIG Fin. Prods. v. ICP Asset Mgmt., No. 651117/2011
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).
45. See Exchange Act § 28(d); Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2)
(2006).
46. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb (2006)) [hereinafter SLUSA].
47. SLUSA, Sec. 101(a), § 16(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d) (2006). SLUSA, like the PSLRA,
applies only to private class actions, but it applies to all private class actions involving
securities fraud, including not only actions under state securities law but even to actions based
on causes of actions based on common-law fraud. Id.; see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 303 (6th ed. 2009).
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48

continue into the foreseeable future, it seems unrealistic to propose
new legislation at this writing. Instead, the SEC and agencies
coordinating with it, especially the CFTC, at the federal level, plus
corresponding state attorneys general and securities officials—acting in
support of funds sponsored by states and their instrumentalities—should
draft regulations based on existing statutes, focusing in particular on
49
enhanced federal–state cooperation.
This Article proposes changes based on revised federal regulations
that will be more effective than reliance on poorly understood and
enforced state laws that are increasingly employed by aggrieved benefit
50
These regulations will both aid benefit funds in recovering
funds.
losses incurred as a result of fraudulent practices in the past, and serve
to prevent similar abuses in the future. The proposed reforms will, inter
alia, provide for systematic cooperation between state and federal
agencies in enforcing the rights of state benefit funds; reduce the scope
of exemptions from registration of new securities under the Securities
51
Act of 1933 (Securities Act); utilize the new tools provided by the
Dodd-Frank Act where possible; and give new teeth to older federal
securities law, including the long-underused Investment Advisers Act of
52
1940 (Advisers Act).
To strengthen the enforcement of claims based on fraud, this Article
proposes regulations based upon statutes enforceable only by the SEC,
including the Advisers Act and certain provisions of the Securities Act
53
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). For new
investments by benefit funds, this Article proposes regulations to be
promulgated by the SEC under existing securities law, including the
Advisers Act, and significant modifications of Rule 506 (promulgated

48. See generally MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 29.
49. See infra notes 308–11, 373–75 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Entwistle & Beemer, supra note 44, at 6. The chief state law remedies are
those for common law fraud, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and state
securities legislation, see id., increasingly including the Uniform Securities Act, 7C U.L.A. 749
(1956), whose section 101 (section 501 in the Revised Unifrom Securities Act, id. at 150,
which has not yet supplanted the original Uniform Securities Act in all states) antifraud
provisions track Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 (although case law has yet to establish whether the
remedies will be interpreted in the same way as federal courts apply Rule 10b-5). 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(c) (2011).
51. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
52. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-20 (2006).
53. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
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54

pursuant to the Securities Act). These will require improved disclosure
of risk factors in the issuance of financial instruments other than
traditional corporate and government securities to public benefit funds;
reduced dependence on ratings by credit rating agencies that, even after
55
Dodd-Frank, remain lightly regulated; and increased aid to state
regulators in establishing sound investment practices for the funds under
56
their supervision.
As noted, regulatory changes to protect benefit funds should focus
on improving coordination between the SEC and state regulators, by
means such as expanding the SEC’s present role in providing training
for lawyers in state attorney generals’ offices in bringing enforcement
actions, and by employing state lawyers to assist thinly staffed SEC
enforcement teams in maintaining actions that only the SEC itself has
57
standing to bring. The SEC can also amend current regulations to
protect benefit funds going forward by limiting the ability of smaller
funds to buy privately placed securities and by applying the SEC’s
“Plain English” disclosure rules to all securities disclosure, which
58
includes private placement memos.
II.

EXOTIC SECURITIES IN THE NEW GILDED AGE

The last thirty years have been marked by a proliferation of new
types of securities, which steadily increased in complexity, risk, and
59
difficulties in understanding the nature of the risk presented. The
problem has been aggravated by the deregulation of the financial
60
system, which created a climate of financial recklessness bringing to
61
mind the “Gilded Age” of the late nineteenth century.
54. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012).
55. See infra notes 280–85, 334–49 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 307, 348–51 and accompanying text.
57. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
58. Since 1998, the SEC has required disclosure in any prospectus accompanying
registered securities to be written in Plain English, making it clear to investors exactly what
risks they face. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.420–.421. See generally OFFICE INVESTOR EDUC.
ASSISTANCE, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE
CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS (1998).
59. See infra Part II.A.
60. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 23–28 (noting that the deregulation of financial
industry was a major contributor to the escalation of risk in assets leading to financial crisis);
infra Part III.A.
61. See generally 12 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, VORLESUNGEN ÜBER DIE
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At the same time that the nature of the securities made them less
comprehensible to potential purchasers and even the financial
intermediaries peddling them, the low interest rates on conventional
debt securities based on Federal Reserve policy since the turn of the
62
century created an appetite for higher yields, particularly by
63
underfunded benefit funds.
Even a benefit fund receiving
contributions at levels that previously sufficed to meet eventual
beneficiary claims would face eventual underfunding if it followed old
patterns of investing in well-understood and traditionally safe
64
instruments such as government securities and corporate bonds. For
many benefit funds, whose contribution rates fell well below the amount
needed to fund promised benefits even if invested in traditional
instruments, the potential deficits ran much higher—threatening cities
65
and other state subdivisions with Chapter 9 bankruptcy, with ripple
effects threatening the states themselves and the larger national

PHILOSOPHIE DER WELTGESCHICHTE 8 (1831) (translated by author) (on file with author)
(“Was die Erfahrung aber und die Geschichte lehren, ist dieses, daß Völker und die
Regierungen niemals etwas aus der Geschichte lehren . . . haben,” very roughly translated,
“The only thing we learn from history is that we never learn anything from history”); MARK
TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TODAY (1873).
62. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 122–29; see also E. Scott Reckard, Despite Paying
Record Low Interest Rates, Banks are Awash in Deposits That They Don’t Want, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2011, at B1.
63. See Kaplan & Eligon, supra note 8; see, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh & Danny Hakim,
Public Pensions Faulted for Bets on Rosy Returns, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, at A1 (noting
that public pensions operate on estimated yield of 7% to 8% on invested contributions,
though actual yields have fallen to 5% to 7% since 2000).
64. See, e.g., Yes, They Can Go Down Too, supra note 23 (noting that Dallas Police and
Fire Pension Funds bought high-risk CDOs to boost rates of return).
65. See Walsh & Hakim, supra note 63. Municipalities and other state instrumentalities
(though not states themselves) may file for bankruptcy reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 901.
In the current crisis, Stockton, California filed for bankruptcy on June 28, 2012, Complaint at
1, Ass’n Retired Emps. v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), No. 12-32118-C-9, 2012
WL 3193588 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 10, 2012), becoming the largest city to file under Chapter
9 to date, see Stockton, Calif. Files for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, NBCNEWS.COM (June 28,
2012),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/48006746/ns/business-us_business/#.T_MCjpFnU6w.
Significantly, the largest single claim against Stockton is by CALPERS for $147.5 million in
unfunded pension liabilities. Stockton, Calif. Files for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, supra. The
Association of Retired Employees of the City of Stockton initiated a class action against the
City of Stockton seeking a ruling ordering “the City to keep paying for their health benefits
during th[e] chapter 9 case.” Ass’n Retired Emps. v. City of Stockton (In re City of
Stockton), No. 12-32118-C-9, 2012 WL 3193588, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012). The
bankruptcy court dismissed the retiree’s claim. Id. at *18–19.
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66

economy.

A. The Onset of Complexity: Asset-Backed Securities
Low yields on traditional securities helped fuel the growth of new
types of securities, which offered higher yields at the cost of rapidly
increasing complexity, volatility, and concealed risk. These can be
described generically as asset-backed securities, since all of them, from
67
plain-vanilla mortgage-backed Fannie Mae securities to the most
complex derivatives based on them, rest on assets—pooled debt
instruments—that provide regular streams of payments.
The forerunner of all of these securities was the residential
68
Securities backed by pools of
mortgage-backed security (RMBS).
mortgages were sold in the U.S. at least as early as the 1880s, but were
first issued in their modern form by the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) while it was still a government agency, in
69
Fannie Mae was split into two entities—the Government
1966.

66. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
67. “Fannie Mae” is the nickname generally used for the Federal National Mortgage
Association, founded as a government agency in 1934 and privatized—but with a remaining
link to the federal government that has proven costly to taxpayers—in 1968. See Richard E.
Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the
CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1364–66.
68. The SEC, in its proposed rulemaking concerning the Dodd-Frank provisions
affecting rating agencies, has divided asset-backed securities into the RMBS, commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), commercial loan obligations (CLOs), asset-backed
commercial paper conduits (ABCP), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs—covering
asset-backed securities including miscellaneous collateral, including other asset-backed
securities). See Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-64514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,436 n.152–56 (proposed June 8, 2011) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249). For purposes of this Article, asset-backed
securities backed by mortgages will be referred to generically as “collateralized mortgage
obligations” (CMOs), as they were when they reemerged on the financial scene in the late
1970s.
69. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1365. Actually, what may have been the earliest
form of mortgage-backed security, the Pfandbrief (plural “Pfandbriefe”—German nouns are
always capitalized), was introduced by Frederick the Great of Prussia as early as 1769 to help
pay the ruinous costs of the Seven Years’ War, and has received a new lease on life during the
past few years in the form of “covered bonds” being issued not only in other civil law
countries but in the United States as well. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of
Covered Bonds, 66 BUS. LAW. 561, 563–64 (2011); Stefan Kofner, The German Pfandbrief
System Facing the Financial Crisis, Prepared for the European Network of Housing
Research: International Housing Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, June 28–July 1, 2009,
available athttp://www.soc.cas.cz/download/808/paper_Kofner_01.pdf. Pfandbriefe continue
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National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), which remained a
70
government agency —and the present Fannie Mae, which was largely
71
privatized (but continued to buy mortgages for securitization) in 1968.
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac) was created
in 1970 as a publicly held corporation, also for the primary purpose of
72
enhancing the market for buying, selling, and securitizing mortgages.
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately held, the fact that
their securities were exempt from SEC registration, and that they held
their charters and emergency lines of credit from the federal
government, led participants in the secondary mortgage markets to
believe—before the financial crisis—that they enjoyed implicit
73
They are therefore
guaranties from the federal government.
74
commonly called “government-sponsored enterprises” (GSEs).
Beginning about 1977, investment banks began to follow the GSEs
in buying pools of mortgages and issuing “private label” CMOs that
passed through proportionate shares of principal and interest from the
75
In a basic CMO, a mortgage
underlying mortgages to purchasers.
to flourish in Germany, regulated by the Pfandbriefgesetz, a statute that has been continually
modernized (most recently in 2009), and their analogues have become popular in other civil
law countries. Pfandbriefgesetz, PfandBG [Pfandbrief Act], 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL]
at Teil I, §§ 1373–93, as amended by Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung des Pfandbriefrechts
vom Marz 2009 (Ger.), available at http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/0/B4DE7DF10
6F794A8C12579A70030C6E5/$FILE/PfandBG_BGBl_2005_I_13731393.pdf?OpenElement.
Because Pfandbrief are regulated by law that ensures their backing by high-quality collateral,
they
are
safer
than
their
CMO
cousins
and
have
weathered
the
present economic storm far better. See Advantages of Pfandbriefe, VERBAND DEUTSCHER
PFANDBRIEFBANKEN, http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en_141.htm (last
visited Sept. 13, 2012). Despite the new vogue for “covered bonds,” which employ structural
elements borrowed from the Pfandbriefgesetz, American law does not provide the kind of
regulation that gives Pfandbriefe their reliability. In fact, fairly drastic changes in U.S. law
such as statutorily mandated certification and monitoring of issuers and their collateral would
be required to establish a similar level of safety. See, e.g., Pfandbriefgesetz, Teil I, §§ 1373–93.
70. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1365–66.
71. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 536
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006)).
72. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450, 450
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (2006)) (creating an act “[t]o increase the availability of
mortgage credit for the financing of urgently needed housing, and for other purposes”).
73. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1366–67.
74. See, e.g., THE BOND MARKET ASSOCIATION, AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO PASSTHROUGH AND COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE SECURITIES 2 (2002), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/about_MBS.pdf; Mendales, supra note 67, at 1366.
75. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1367.

12 - MENDALES FINAL PRINTER

258

12/28/2012 11:14 AM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:241

originator (originally a bank or thrift institution, but, as the 1990s wore
76
on, increasingly a nontraditional and largely unregulated lender) sells
mortgage instruments to an investment bank, which pools mortgages
thus obtained and transfers them to an entity legally known as a “special
77
purpose vehicle” (SPV). The SPV then sells securities representing
78
fractional shares of the pool to investors.
The investors receive
proportionate shares of the total payments of interest and principal by
79
mortgagors on the instruments held in the pool. The advantages to an
investor in buying a mortgage-backed security include the purported
safety of mortgages as collateral, diversification of risk by using
80
mortgages from different geographic areas in each pool; and, crucial
for yield-starved benefit funds, interest rates that were higher than those
81
on similarly rated corporate debt obligations.

76. Nontraditional mortgage companies were loosely and inconsistently regulated by the
states rather than the federal government, which regulated FDIC-insured banks and thrifts.
See Martin N. Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1,
at 79, 82. The increasing origination of mortgages by these poorly regulated entities, with the
intent to sell them for securitization rather than to keep on the originators’ balance sheets,
was a factor in the deterioration of mortgage collateral that contributed to the financial crisis.
See id. at 79–82.
77. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv)(B)(1) (2012) (providing a formal defintion of SPV).
SPVs are also, less formally, referred to in finance as “special purpose entities” (SPEs). See
Stephen Bryan et al., Curbing Optimism in Managerial Estimates Through Transparent
Accounting, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR
ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 361, 361–62.
78. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1367.
79. See id. at 1364–67. SPVs have also been used for shady accounting purposes such as
removing questionable items from corporate balance sheets in cases such as Enron. See
Enron Aside, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) Are Legal, Innovative and Widely Used,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 17, 2006), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?
articleid=1483.
80. The apparent safety of diversification may be illusory, since the diversification of an
asset portfolio becomes meaningless “if it is duplicated by enough people.” John E.
Martinsen, Four Paradoxes of the 2008–2009 Economic and Financial Crisis, in LESSONS
FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE,
supra note 1, at 59, 65.
81. See John D. Martin, A Primer on the Role of Securitization in the Credit Market
Crisis of 2007, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 199, 202. In fact, however, well before the
financial crisis precipitated by the bursting of the housing bubble in 2007–2008, it became
clear that the risk associated with investment-grade corporate debt was significantly less than
that associated with mortgage-backed securities given similar ratings. See infra notes 121, 130
and accompanying text.
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Safety, at least as measured by ratings issued by the three leading
credit rating agencies (SEC-accredited rating agencies are officially
known as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations,” or
82
“NRSROs”), was vital for CMOs. This was not only a practical sales
point, but a legal necessity, because ratings were the key to special
treatment under the securities laws based on the 1984 Secondary
83
Under SMMEA,
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (SMMEA).
CMO instruments with face amounts above $250,000 and rated in the
top two grades of at least one rating agency accredited by the SEC did
84
not have to be registered under the Securities Act. The pliant SEC of
85
the time established by regulation that SPVs and CMOs would not
have to apply to the agency for letter rulings establishing that they did
86
not have to register under the Investment Company Act of 1940, but
would be considered automatically exempt from regulation.
Apart from SMMEA’s effect on private label securities, it also
authorized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to deal in subordinate lien
87
mortgages, making their securities riskier—especially in the absence of
88
effective accounting controls. This, along with the deterioration in
82. See Exchange Act § 15E, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006). Throughout the period in
question, ratings were issued by an oligopoly consisting of three credit rating agencies
recognized by the SEC: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and a lesser player, Fitch. See Frank
Partnoy, The Siskel & Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating
Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 648 n.137 (1999).
83. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, § 101, 98
Stat. 1689 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
84. Id. § 106.
85. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2011). As the financial crisis gathered momentum in July,
2008, the SEC, while admitting that it originated the term “NRSRO” in its rules in 1975,
claimed that its use of ratings was “for a narrow purpose,” though admitting that ratings had
become widely used in state, federal, and even international regulations, and attempted, far
too late, to reduce regulatory dependence on ratings by the major rating agencies. See
References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, DoddFrank Act Release No. 34-58070, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11, 2008) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249). The proposed rule changes to reduce reliance on ratings
were abandoned in 2009, and replaced by new regulations, including some mandated by the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
See Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,420 & n.3
(proposed June 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249).
86. See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006)).
87. See § 203(a), 98 Stat. at 1693.
88. The GSEs’ freedom from SEC registration fostered weak internal accounting
controls which led to a major accounting scandal before the GSEs were actually placed in
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standards for even first-lien mortgages purchased and securitized by the
GSEs, contributed to the unperceived increase in risk in their
securities—and, based on their inventories of these securities—to their
89
own insolvency when the crisis of 2007–2008 struck.
The dependence on ratings was not confined to the U.S. The
discovery that ratings did not accurately predict risk for structured
instruments helped make the 2008 financial crisis worldwide because
instruments purchased based on strong ratings became embedded in the
90
Even the Basel
capital of financial institutions around the world.
Committee on Bank Supervision made ratings the basis for its proposals
91
on the quality of reserve capital required for major international banks.
CMOs, however, were just the first step in creating a new financial
category that became known as “structured finance.” During the 1980s,
CMOs became a subclass of a broader class of securities generally
92
known as “collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs). CDOs based their
cash flow on debt instruments extending beyond the conventional
93
residential mortgages used to back the original CMOs, to include
significantly riskier obligations, including non-conventional mortgages,

receivership. See Kathleen Day, Study Finds ‘Extensive’ Fraud at Fannie Mae: Bonuses
Allegedly Drove the Scheme, WASH. POST, May 24, 2006, at A1. A study by the SEC and the
Office of Federal Housing Oversight (a title with a double meaning) released in 2006 showed
that Fannie Mae alone “misstat[ed] earnings by about $10.6 billion from 1998 through 2004.”
Id.
89. See, e.g., Bloomberg, America’s Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac Tumble on ‘Insolvency’
Fears, TELEGRAPH (July 10, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2793000/AmericasFannie-Mae-and-Freddie-Mac-tumble-on-insolvency-fears.html (noting that GSEs feared
insolvency based on fair value accounting because of their large borrowing to purchase
mortgage-backed securities for their inventories).
90. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 40,088; POSNER, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that worldwide
distribution of U.S. mortgage-backed securities helped “globalize” what might have been a
purely U.S. crisis).
91. See MICHAEL B. GORDY, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., MODEL
FOUNDATIONS FOR THE SUPERVISORY FORMULA APPROACH 1 (2004).
92. See Peter Cohan, Behind the $4 Trillion in CDOs: Sneaky Banks and Worthless
Ratings, DAILY FIN. (Apr. 26, 2010, 10:45 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/04/26/expl
aining-the-4-trillion-cdo-scam-worthless-ratings-hide-inve/.
93. “Conventional mortgages” are mortgages which, though not insured by the Federal
Housing Authority, meet the statutory standards set for mortgages that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are allowed to purchase. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (9th ed. 2009).
Under Freddie Mac’s statutory charter, these must “meet generally the purchase standards
imposed by private institutional mortgage investors.” 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(1) (2006).
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94

commercial mortgages, and other, still less secure debt including car
loans, student loans, unsecured obligations such as commercial paper,
95
credit card debt, other CDOs, and even derivatives not directly based
96
on collateral pools backing particular CDOs. CDO collateral pools
included other asset-backed securities whose safety was assessed based
97
on the less than reliable standards set by credit rating agencies —
although mortgages remained the most important instruments
98
underlying CDOs in terms of aggregate value.
CDOs were supposed to be safe because the safety of at least the
99
highest-rated tranches of a CDO pool, as with CMOs, was one of their
100
chief selling points.
This presumed safety, which both buyers and
regulators imprudently inferred from high ratings given to instruments

94. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (discusssing the special risk characteristics
of commercial mortgages).
95. A CDO composed of tranches of other CDOs is known as a “CDO squared.” See
Whalen, supra note 19, at 8–9; CDO-Squared, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=CDO_squared (last visited Sept. 13, 2012). Securities of this
kind were not registered and sold over the counter to accredited investors under SEC
exemptions from registration. Whalen, supra note 19, at 8–9. Because of their opacity—a
purchaser relied on the ratings of the CDO collateral rather than underlying assets—their sale
benefited only their dealers and when general confidence in structured securities faltered,
their market collapsed, leaving their purchasers with enormous losses. See Whalen, supra
note 19, at 8–9; CDO-Squared, supra.
96. See Adrian A.R.J.M. van Rixtel & Sarai Criado, The Contribution of Structured
Finance to the Financial Crisis: An Introductory Overview, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 239, 240;
Whalen, supra note 19, at 8. Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae underwriting standards were also
initially used to assure favorable repayment characteristics for securitized mortgages. See
Problems in Mortgage Packaging: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urb. Aff., 99th Cong. 89–91 (1985)
(statement of Laurence D. Fink, Managing Director, First Boston Corporation) [hereinafter
Statement of Laurence D. Fink].
97. See infra notes 114–24 and accompanying text (concerning rating standards).
98. See Peter L. Swan, The Global Crisis and Its Origins, in LESSONS FROM THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1,
at 51, 51–56; infra notes 128–43 and accompanying text.
99. See Complaint at 7, SEC v. Steffelin (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) (No. 11-Civ.-4204)
(CDO pools were divided into different “tranches” with higher and lower priority claims to
the cash flows from the pools for the use of tranches to enhance the ratings given to the
highest-priority tranches with interests in a single CDO pool).
100. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the TooBig-to-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 724 (2010) (noting that “[i]nvestors relied
heavily on credit ratings” for complex instruments because their “complexity . . . made it
difficult” for outsiders to determine the level of risk).
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in each pool by the three leading credit rating agencies, was originally
based on the presumed security of conventional mortgage lending
101
standards, augmented by what were called “credit enhancements” to
protect holders against prepayment of standard mortgages, and for less
102
reliable collateral such as commercial mortgages and obligations not
103
secured by mortgages.
The earliest credit enhancements were relatively straightforward.
Some resembled the protective features of German Pfandbriefe, which,
104
as noted above, were fairly effective in withstanding the financial crisis
105
of 2007–2008. These features included: overcollateralization, including
assets in a pool with nominal values greater than the value of securities
sold based on interests in the pool; recourse—the requirement that
sellers of mortgages into a pool retain at least part of their risk of
106
default; backing by insurance-type arrangements, including standby
107
letters of credit issued by banks to make good on defaulted collateral;
108
such as
and insurance issued by monoline insurance carriers,

101. Statement of Laurence D. Fink, supra note 96, at 90–92.
102. Even early securitizers recognized that commercial mortgages had sharply different
and less predictable risk characteristics than residential home mortgages. See Secondary
Market For Commercial Real Estate Loans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pol’y Res. and
of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urb. Aff., 102nd Cong. 56 (1992) (statement of
Michael L. O’Hanlon, Managing Director, Lehman Brothers); Marc Hochstein & Heather
Timmons, Credit Drought Withering Specialty Finance Firms, AM. BANKER, Nov. 4, 1998,
at 1.
103. See Cohan, supra note 92.
104. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
105. See Kofner, supra note 69, at 19.
106. Over collateralization and retention of risk by mortgage originators are among the
features that give Pfandbriefe their safety. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Pfandbriefe, however, have additional safety factors such as statutory supervision that have
never had a place in Wall Street CMOs. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
107. Standby letters of credit, unlike commercial letters of credit, require the issuing
bank to pay a beneficiary only on default by banks customers purchasing the instruments, and
thereby act as insurance. See I. Walter Deitch, Fundamentals of Commercial and Standby
Letters of Credit, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/fundam
entals-commercial-and-standby-letters-credit.
108. Monoline insurers engage solely in insuring financial instruments. Dwight Jaffee,
Monoline Restrictions, with Applications to Mortgage Insurance and Title Insurance, 28 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 83, 83 (2006). They emerged in the 1970s, originally insuring municipal
securities but soon extending their coverage to asset-backed securities. See Dave Bradford &
Johanny Cruz, Monoline Meltdown, INSIDER Q., Summer 2008, at 64; see also Monoline
Insurance Companies, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monolineinsura
nce.asp#axzz1ht1AiPzj (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). Their specialization is a result of state
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109

AMBAC. Each of these protective features carried with it expenses
that raised the cost to issuers and underwriters, who sought to cut their
costs by devising less expensive but unproven protective measures
110
inherent in the structure of the asset-backed securities themselves.
B. Ratcheting Up Complexity: Derivatives Based on Asset-Backed
Securities
By the mid-1980s, the original forms of credit enhancement
appeared too awkward and expensive to the investment banks that
111
structured “private label” asset-backed securities.
They therefore
devised alternatives based on the structure of the securities themselves
that were less expensive to issuers and more flexible in permitting the
use of new types of collateral, bearing higher risk than traditional
112
Although the credit rating agencies continued to give
mortgages.
many of the higher risk mortgages top ratings, the agencies did so by
creating untested and undisclosed economic models for safety; the
instruments that they gave high ratings, in fact carried significantly
113
higher levels of risk than similarly rated conventional debt securities.
regulation forbidding traditional insurers from issuing such policies. See Jaffee, supra, at 91 &
n.15. This absence of diversity in their risk portfolios makes them and their insurance
products riskier than traditional insurers and their products.
109. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEA, SECURITIZATION: A PRIMER ON STRUCTURES AND
CREDIT ENHANCEMENT 8 (2006); Partnoy, supra note 82, at 671. In the experience of the
author of this Article at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in New York during the early
days of private label securitization in the 1980s, the first widely-used forms of credit
enhancement were recourse, overcollateralization, insurance from monoline insurers, and
standby letters of credit from banks. Recourse posed a particular problem because the
transfers of mortgages from originators to SPVs were intended to be true sales, making the
SPVs remote from any hypothetical bankruptcy of the originator, while significant retention
of risk by the issuer created the danger that a bankruptcy court would rule that an intended
sale was merely a secured loan, so that the SPV would not be remote from a bankruptcy case
involving the issuer.
110. See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
111. “Private label” asset-backed securities are those issued by financial institutions
other than the so-called government sponsored entities (GSEs), including Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), both of which created
traditional-style CMOs. See Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (July 23,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm. Ginnie Mae, the Government
National Mortgage Association, remains a government agency, and guaranties mortgages but
does not assemble them into pools for slicing and dicing into mortgage-backed securities. Id.
112. See Cohan, supra note 92.
113. See Wilmarth, supra note 100, at 724–25. Although the chief focus on ratings has
been on the inaccuracy of high ratings used in the initial sale of securities—especially complex

12 - MENDALES FINAL PRINTER

264

12/28/2012 11:14 AM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:241

The credit rating agencies did so at least in part because of a new
business model that created a major conflict of interest for them. Prior
to 1970, they were paid by subscribers—and even then their ratings,
114
particularly for lower-rated securities, were criticized for unreliability.
During the 1970s, however, the agencies began to receive most of their
115
income as fees paid by the issuers of securities that they rated. They
made this change just at the time that their ratings became more central
to the financial system because government agencies, starting, ironically,
with the SEC, began to use them as a basis for judging the quality of
securities used as reserves by securities dealers and other moneyed
116
This augmented the agencies’ conflicts of interest by
businesses.
increasing pressure on them by issuers and underwriters to issue high
117
ratings for the issuers’ securities.
In no context did this conflict manifest itself more strongly than in
118
While the agencies used the
the issuance of asset-backed securities.
same letter ratings for these securities as for conventional corporate
119
The
debt, the new securities had different default characteristics.
agencies did not test their methodologies to assure that a CDO rated
AAA possessed the same degree of safety that such a rating would
120
indicate for a conventional corporate bond. Studies done well before
the 2008 crash showed that in fact CDOs given investment-grade ratings
one-off asset-backed securities, a further problem is that the sensitivity of asset-backed
securities to changes in the value of collateral requires ratings already issued to be frequently
reviewed and, where appropriate, downgraded—and the rating agencies were notoriously
slow to downgrade securities based on adverse information. See The Role of Credit Rating
Agencies in the Structured Finance Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts.,
Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 114–15 (2007)
(prepared statement of Joseph R. Mason, Associate Professor, Drexel University)
[hereinafter Statement of Joseph R. Mason].
114. See Partnoy, supra note 82, at 647, 652–53.
115. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1679 (2008).
116. See Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure: How Moody’s and Other Credit-Rating
Agencies Licensed the Abuses That Created the Housing Bubble—and Bust, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Apr. 27, 2008, at 36, 39.
117. See Partnoy, supra note 82, at 652–53.
118. See Kettering, supra note 115, at 1681 (by 2006, Moody’s received over 45% of its
rating revenues from ‘“structured finance’ transactions”).
119. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 41.
120. Id. (noting that prior to the failure of the CDO market in 2007, Moody’s rated
CDOs based on models relying on the securities’ structure, using untested assumptions and
without conducting due diligence concerning the quality of the underlying collateral).
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failed at a much higher rate than conventional corporate debt.
The first technique used to obtain high ratings for asset-backed
securities based on structure rather than external credit enhancement
was to sell securities with different priority rights to streams of payments
122
Investment bankers, rather
from a given pool of debt instruments.
than including an excess of collateral or obtaining external support such
as insurance for obligations based on a pool of debt instruments, divided
securities deriving payments of principal and interest from a given pool
into “tranches”—often five or more based on a single pool of debt
123
instruments. A first and sometimes a second tranche would have prior
rights to payment over subsequent tranches on income from the same
124
pool of debt instruments, and hence, would benefit from what was
called the “waterfall” effect receiving the backing of greater assets than
125
the nominal value of the tranche. This generally sufficed to persuade
pliable credit rating agencies to give first (and sometimes second)
126
tranches their top ratings for ability to pay interest and principal —
ratings that should have been questionable not only because the
agencies’ models were untested but were tainted by the rating agencies’
127
payment by the issuers of the CDOs they were rating.

121. See infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
122. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 39–41.
123. See, e.g., BOND MARKET ASSOCIATION, supra note 74, at 7.
124. Priority gave senior tranches the right to receive payments of principal and interest
from a pool of debt instruments to the full amount due the senior tranches on any date
payment was due, before any payments could be made to junior tranches. See, e.g.,
Complaint at 6–7, SEC v. Steffelin, (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) (No. 11-Civ.-4204). Priority
could be sequential—based on earlier payment due senior tranches than for junior tranches (a
significant factor, since one of the problems faced by holders of mortgage-backed securities
consists of prepayments by mortgagors on their underlying debt)—or by contractual
subordination of junior tranches. See, e.g., id. By analogy to the normal priority of
distributions under corporate law, the most junior tranches with rights against any pool were
often referred to as the “equity.” See, e.g., id. (the “equity” tranches of a CDO are the most
subordinate, generally unrated notes secured by a given pool of assets).
125. See id. at 7.
126. See, e.g., Realtek Indus. v. Nomura Sec., 939 F. Supp. 572, 576 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(noting that higher priority tranches had prior claims on cash flow from collateral pool,
entitling senior tranches to higher ratings); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
127. The rating agencies were also, unlike other participants in the creation of new
securities, largely unregulated by the securities laws until the passage of the totally
inadequate Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)). This statute attempted to address agency deficiencies by
encouraging the creation of competing agencies, but actually forbade the SEC from
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Despite the dubious character of the ratings, they became
increasingly important to the buyers of asset-backed securities as the
securities became more complex, since the ratings were the only
generally accepted way to assess the ability of a new type of security to
128
Even before the quality of collateral
pay principal and interest.
providing cash flows for CDOs began to decline in the late 1990s,
however, it became clear that ratings for structured finance securities
did not mean the same thing as the same ratings given to conventional
corporate debt: an asset-backed security rated AAA was much more
129
likely to default than a corporate bond with the same rating. During
the period 1993–2005, well before subprime mortgages became the chief
collateral backing CDOs, CDOs rated Baa by Moody’s (the lowest
“investment grade” rating given by Moody’s) had ten times the default
130
risk of conventional debt with the same rating.
The incommensurability of ratings between asset-backed securities
and conventional investments was aggravated during the late 1980s with
the creation of an additional level of complexity in structured securities
that added derivative obligations to the mix. Derivatives are financial
instruments whose values are based on the values of other instruments,
131
They are an ancient financial
including securities and commodities.
132
device that can be useful to plan for future swings in prices, originating
with commodity futures, where users of commodities hedge against the
risk that commodities they use routinely will rise or fall in price by
buying contracts to acquire the commodities in question at a future date
for a specified price which fits the buyer’s risk profile. Thus, an airline
can hedge against the risk that aviation fuel will rise sharply in price
over a three-month period by buying a contract to acquire a certain
amount of that fuel three months after the futures contract is made, at a
price that is within limits the airline considers reasonable. On the other
side, a producer of grain can hedge against a sharp drop in grain prices
six months hence by making a contract to sell a large part of its
attempting to regulate the rating process. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1385–87.
128. See Partnoy, supra note 82, at 648, 651, 664–65.
129. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 37–38.
130. See Statement of Joseph R. Mason, supra note 113, at 3.
131. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 93, at 509. See generally René M. Stulz,
Demystifying Financial Derivatives, MILKEN INST. REV., Third Quarter 2005, at 20.
132. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 47–48 (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Clarendon Press 1908).
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production of the grain at something approaching present prices six
133
Commodities futures are relatively well
months in the future.
understood, and the garden variety—chiefly consisting of futures
contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade—is regulated by the
134
Federal Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
During the 1990s, however, derivative securities were developed
based on anticipated changes in the values of CDOs, which functioned
more to multiply the level of risk than to hedge against rationally
135
These new derivatives added
anticipated future changes in value.
increasing levels of complexity to what had already become complex
financial instruments. The most basic of these derivatives were “credit
default swap” (CDS) transactions, in which one financial institution
agreed to pay the other if specified CDOs held by the other defaulted, in
136
return for fees corresponding to insurance premiums. The contracts
creating rights to receive payments on default, and rights to receive fees
for protecting holders of debt-based collateral, both derived value from
137
that collateral, and were thus considered “derivative” securities.

133. See Stulz, supra note 131, at 22; Glyn A. Holton, Futures, RISKGLOSSARY.COM,
http://www.riskglossary.com/link/future.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
134. See generally Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2012).
135. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 126–27; Cris Sholto Heaton, The Dangers of
Derivatives, MONEYWEEK (Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/stockmarkets/the-dangers-of-derivatives.
136. Credit default swaps were invented by JPMorgan in 1994. See Matthew Philips, The
Monster That Ate Wall Street: How ‘Credit Default Swaps’—An Insurance Against Bad
Loans—Turned From a Smart Bet Into a Killer, NEWSWEEK: THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 26,
2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/26/the-monster-that-atewall-street.html. The first major CDS deal, involving about $9.7 billion, was done by Morgan
in 1997. Id. Their use grew exponentially until the CDS market volume exceeded $45 trillion
by mid-2007, more than twice the value of equities traded on U.S. stock markets. See Janet
Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME (Mar. 17, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html. CDS transactions could be
described as riskier versions of earlier use of monoline insurance policies—riskier in that
swap counterparties are not regulated insurers, and lack diversification in the portfolios of
securities that they insured. Id. Ironically, JPMorgan itself made 2012 headlines by losing
billions of dollars through inappropriate use of CDS transactions. See David Henry &
Carrick Mollenkamp, Analysis: The Core Problems with JPMorgan’s Failed Trades, REUTERS
(May 14, 2012, 2:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/14/us-jpmorgan-tradesidUSBRE84D04X20120514.
137. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron Rerun: The Credit Crisis in Three Easy Pieces, in
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC
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A CDO based solely on derivative rights is known as a “synthetic”
138
CDO, and the risks incurred by holders of its various tranches—and
hence its value—is, because of the added level of complexity, much
harder to determine than an asset-backed security collateralized by
139
direct obligations. This was particularly true before the collapse of the
housing bubble in 2007, when Moody’s, for example, did not reevaluate
the models it used for its ratings before the looming disaster became
140
clear even to the rating agencies.
In part, this was because the instruments used as reference portfolios
141
for CDOs were evaluated for quality largely based on ratings assigned
to them by agencies, such as Moody’s, based on mathematical models
that relied on unproven assumptions rather than on due diligence as to
142
the soundness of underlying collateral.
Moreover, even had due
diligence on underlying collateral been performed, the complexity of the
new instruments became so great that even those who traded them in
143
huge volume had no way to rationally evaluate their underlying value.

FAILURE, supra note 1, at 43, 43–45, 49 n.5; van Rixtel & Criado, supra note 96, at 242.
138. See Sanjeev Arora et al., Computational Complexity and Informational Asymmetry
in Financial Products 1 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper 2009), available at
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rongge/derivative.pdf (noting that use of derivatives in financial
products increases information asymmetry between sellers and buyers so that even a buyer
with substantial information and great computational power cannot adequately compute their
value); Michael S. Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Working Paper No. 2004-36, 2004).
139. See Martin, supra note 81, at 204; Arora et al., supra note 138; Gibson, supra note
138, at 1, 18, 21, 23, 25–26 (models used in disclosure of risks in various tranches of CDOs
result in systematic failure by CDO sellers to disclose full risks imposed on buyers).
140. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 39–40.
141. A reference portfolio consists of real assets in other CDOs by which the value of a
synthetic CDO is determined, usually linked to the real debt instruments in the other CDOs
by credit default swaps. See FITCH RATINGS, SYNTHETIC OVERVIEW FOR CMBS
INVESTORS 1, 7 (Sept. 26, 2005), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/synthetic
_cmbs.pdf. Since the buyer of a tranche in a synthetic CDO does not directly own the
underlying collateral, but only derivatives based on their assumed likelihood of default, the
buyer cannot perform due diligence on the quality of the underlying assets. See id. at 1, 7–8.
142. See generally Gibson, supra note 138.
143. See Martin, supra note 81, at 204. In fact, mathematical models used to determine
the probability of default are so complex that they require their users to make substantial,
possibly counterfactual assumptions. See generally GORDY, supra note 91. The complexity of
the computations used by modelers such as Gordy, requiring elaborate numerical integration,
suggests that results in terms of the probability of default under any model will be altered
with extreme sensitivity based on any deviation from initial data or assumptions—in other
words, any change from initial assumptions will cause chaotic, and hence unpredictable,

12 - MENDALES FINAL PRINTER

2012]

12/28/2012 11:14 AM

FITTING AN OLD TIGER

269

Since most of them were exempt from registration under the Securities
Act because their sales were exempt from registration under SEC Rule
144
506, most were created in private contracts between institutions and
145
traded over the counter rather than on recognized exchanges.
Therefore, central banks such as the Federal Reserve and other
regulatory institutions were unable to estimate their volume—which was
trillions of dollars worldwide—or what effect defaults in underlying
collateral would have on the entire financial house of cards and thus,
given the effects on key financial institutions—on the U.S. and world
146
economies.
C. The Downward Spiral of Quality in Collateral: The Great Debt
Bubble of 1998–2006
While part of the fragility of the CDO market was a function of the
variations from the results predicted by the model used for the initial rating of a security.
Chaotic behavior of this kind is what makes long-term weather prediction impossible even
with high-quality data. See JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 8 (1987); see
also James K. Galbraith, The Roots of the Crisis and How to Bring It to a Close, in LESSONS
FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE,
supra note 1, at 37, 38 (noting that Mandelbrot’s new mathematics of fractal geometry—the
field of mathematics that has become known as “chaos”—challenged traditional economic
models). The intractability of this problem is further supported by the failure of sophisticated
mathematical methods to prevent the insolvency of Long-Term Capital Management, a large
hedge fund that employed Nobel laureates in economics. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN
GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000);
POSNER, supra note 1, at 131–32 (“[I]t’s impossible to calculate the exact conditions that will
precipitate collapse, and this uncertainty makes it impossible to predict the collapse with any
precision.”). LCTM failed despite sophisticated mathematical models because sensitive
dependence on initial conditions made it impossible for the models to predict failure when
actual conditions varied from their assumptions. POSNER, supra note 1, at 131–32
144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012).
145. See Whalen, supra note 19, at 9 (explosive growth of demand for non-transparent
OTC instruments, where risk could not be modeled except by dealers who sold them and not
by buyers or rating agencies, helped create the global financial crisis when dealers stopped
providing a secondary market for them in 2007).
146. See Implementing Derivatives Reform: Reducing Systemic Risk and Improving
Market Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Aff., 112th
Cong. 1–3 (2012) (statement of Gary Gensler, Chairman, CFTC), avaialable at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=10c178efa902-4842-9972-ca169eaceb7d (noting that the notional value of the global market for swaps,
largely unregulated before the 2008 crisis, now exceeds $700 trillion); Bruce I. Jacobs,
Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis, in LESSONS FROM
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra
note 1, at 225.
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complexity of the instruments traded in that market, an even more
significant factor arose with the increasing burdens of debt borne both
by individuals and institutions, originating in stagnating individual
incomes and fed by easy credit, that led to the housing bubble, which
148
took off after the turn of the century. Consumer debt began rising as
early as the 1970s, in part to replace actual income—median per capita
149
income in the U.S. leveled off in 1973, and consumers substituted debt
150
for increasing income to maintain expected standards of living. This
long-term structural problem was aggravated by events in the financial
sector.
A preliminary crisis, which should have warned participants in the
market for complex securities of the larger crisis to come, was the failure
151
of a hedge fund called Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. The
hedge fund had based its investing strategy on complex mathematical
models, which failed it both because of the complexity of the
instruments in which the fund invested and because of the weakness in
152
The Federal Reserve,
the collateral underlying those instruments.
fearing that the failure could trigger a recession, cut interest rates to
153
near-record lows. The Federal Reserves’ action was based not only on

147. See Kettering, supra note 115; Lipson, supra note 137, at 43–44; supra Part II.B. and
accompanying text.
148. See Edward Luce, The Dream That Died: The Crisis of Middle-Class America, FT
WEEKEND MAG., July 31–Aug. 1, 2010, at 18, 22 (stating that incomes of bottom 90% of U.S.
families essentially flat since 1973, with lost increases in wage income made up by increasing
debt).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 126. A hedge fund is an investment company—i.e., a
fund that invests in securities or other assets of other businesses—that, because most of its
investors are “accredited” for purposes of SEC Rule 506 (most benefit funds are accredited
investors for purposes of Rule 506, see infra note 282, 333 and accompanying text), is usually
not required to register with the SEC. See Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge Funds
and Funds of Hedge Funds, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm
(last visited Sept. 23, 2012). Hedge funds, originally small investment vehicles used by
wealthy individuals, came to control major assets by the 1990s, and their risky investment
strategies made them a factor in world financial instability. See Duff McDonald, The Running
of the Hedgehogs, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 16, 2007, at 42–44. By 2007, this destabilizing potential
had grown tenfold from the 1990s, with over $2 trillion under hedge fund management. Id.
152. See Hershey H. Friedman & Linda Weiser Friedman, The Global Financial Crisis of
2008: What Went Wrong?, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 31, 31–32.
153. See Steve Schifferes, Financial Crises: Lessons from History, BBC NEWS (Sept. 3,
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the failure of Long-Term Capital at home, but on the bursting of
financial bubbles overseas that helped to kill Long-Term Capital,
including sovereign default crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin America,
and the bursting of the “dot-com” stock market bubble in the U.S.
which, continuing through 2002, helped motivate the Federal Reserves
154
to keep down interest rates. These low rates, which were reflected in
loans made throughout the U.S. economy, including the markets for
government and corporate debt and the home mortgage market, helped
155
lead to the outsized housing bubble of the new century.
The low yields on conventional debt had two significant effects. On
one side, investors, particularly benefit funds that needed higher yields
to fund eventual demands by beneficiaries, began to chase higher yields
in new types of financial instruments, despite their poor understanding
156
On the other side, low
of the risks inherent in these investments.
prevailing interest rates made it easier for debtors, especially home
mortgagors, to afford homes previously beyond their ability to acquire,
helping to inflate a housing bubble that was further aggravated by
157
relaxed lending practices.
The reduction in the general cost of credit, which itself played an
important role in inflating the housing bubble that followed the turn of
the century, accompanied successive and dramatic lowering of the
standards of creditworthiness required of mortgagors. The federal
government played a major part in this, by steadily lowering the
minimum down payments required for FHA insurance, and pressuring
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to lower their creditworthiness
158
requirements for mortgages they would purchase. The government’s
2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6958091.stm.
154. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT:
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 162, 171, 206–07 (2009).
155. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 13–14, 40–41 (2d ed. 2005);
Lipson, supra note 137, at 46 (noting that the “persistent, artificially low prevailing rate of
interest” was a central cause of the financial crisis). During the bubble, the Case-Shiller
housing price index, as compared to increase in GDP and the consumer price index, increased
faster and farther than any previous housing bubble since 1891, the starting point for the
Case-Shiller index. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 154, at 207.
156. See Roger Lowenstein, Looking for the Next Crisis?: Public Pension Funds Are
Massively Short of Money, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 27, 2010, at 9; Walsh & Hakim, supra note
63.
157. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 46–49 (lower mortgage rates increased housing prices
and leverage, increasing systemic risk to the entire economy).
158. See id. at 241–42.
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purpose was to make housing more available to Americans of limited
means, a goal that, while not without superficial appeal, was fraught
with financial peril, as easier lending standards led home prices in the
U.S. to rise 52% between 1997 and 2004, a rate significantly higher than
159
the increase in median income.
While standards for conventional mortgages were eased, mortgage
underwriting standards were further relaxed by private lenders, many of
whom were now unlicensed and used a lending model based on
originating mortgages to sell them for packaging into securities, rather
160
than holding them and the risk attendant upon them. The result was a
proliferation of “Alt-A” mortgages—mortgages to borrowers who could
not quite meet the standards imposed on holders of conventional
161
mortgages —and, worse yet, “subprime” loans—loans backed by
mortgages extended to borrowers who did not even approach the
relaxed federal standards for creditworthiness, documentation, and
other qualifications, such as substantial down payments that were
162
“Subprime”
required for conventional mortgages during the 1990s.
mortgages were often originated by poorly regulated mortgage brokers
on an originate-to-sell business model, so that their originators lacked
the incentive to assure their quality that would have existed had they
163
kept the loans on their balance sheets. This in itself set them off from
traditional mortgages backing loans by institutions such as banks and
thrifts, which started with a model of loans kept on their balance sheets
and therefore had some incentive to assure that they were likely to be
repaid. “Subprime” mortgages began to proliferate before the turn of

159. See SHILLER, supra note 155, at 12–13.
160. See Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages,
ECONOMICLETTER, Nov. 2007, at 2.
161. See FRANK J. FABOZZI, FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 286 (2nd ed. 2002); Alt A
Mortgages, CITYTOWNINFO.COM, http://www.citytowninfo.com/mortgage-articles/specialtymortgages/alt-a-mortgages (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) (noting that Alt-A mortgages were
traditionally mortgages to borrowers who could meet conventional mortgage standards, but
lacked certain documentation; but the designation became a fuzzy term applying to
mortgages just short of conventional mortgage quality but ranking above “subprime”
mortgages).
162. See FABOZZI, supra note 161, at 284.
163. See Baily et al., supra note 76, at 79, 80–83 (noting that when mortgage lenders
originated mortgages intending to sell them for securitization, the mortgages were not kept
on their balance sheets, so they lacked incentive to guard against potential defaults).
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the century, and exploded in volume from 2003 through 2006.
“Subprime” mortgages included several characteristics that made
them, and financial instruments for which they served as, collateral
financial time bombs. Many included specific features that set them
ticking, such as low “teaser” interest rates that mortgagors could barely
afford at the time they signed on the dotted line, but which would
automatically reset to far higher rates—likely to be beyond the
165
Other
mortgagors’ ability to pay—at dates in the near future.
subprime mortgages whose default could readily have been predicted at
the time they were made included “liar loans,” where the mortgagors’
creditworthiness was deliberately misrepresented or totally
undocumented, or where the value of the mortgaged property was
166
deliberately inflated; interest-only loans, where mortgagors would not
167
have to begin repaying principal until a specified time in the future;
and home equity loans based on the equity acquired by the upward
168
spiral of home values based on artificially low credit.
Relaxed standards led to a proliferation of new mortgage lending to
borrowers who represented not merely heightened risks that could be
164. See, e.g., Abol Jalilvand & A.G. (Tassos) Malliaris, Sequence of Asset Bubbles and
the Global Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 139, 141 (noting that the
Federal Reserve contributed to the housing bubble by setting low interest rates in 2003
intended to deal with low economic growth); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition: The Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at http:
//www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm (noting that subprime
mortgage lending, defined as lending to borrowers with high credit risk, proliferated as a
result of securitization).
165. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 154, at 213; Bernanke, supra note 164, at 2–
3 (pointing out that “seasoned” adjustable rate mortgages—those that have been paid on for
several years—have higher delinquency rates); supra note 164 and accompanying text.
166. See John Hechinger, Shaky Foundation: Rising Home Prices Cast Appraisers in a
Harsh Light, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2002, at A1 (brokers and developers systematically
induced real estate appraisers to put unrealistically high values on real estate, with frauds
resulting in legal actions well before the actual topping out of real estate prices in 2006);
Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 38.
167. See David Streitfeld, The House Trap: As an Exotic Mortgage Resets, Payments
Skyrocket, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at B1 (noting that interest-only loans, which are
scheduled to reset to begin amortizing principal, pose threat of large-scale mortgage defaults
in wake of bursting of housing bubble).
168. See Forrest Pafenberg, The Single-Family Mortgage Industry in the Internet Era:
Technology Developments and Market Structure, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 163, 171 .
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estimated with actuarial models based on prior data, but to borrowers
who were virtually certain to default. This qualitative transformation
could have been recognized from earlier experience if regulators, rating
agencies, and other participants in the issuance of asset-backed
169
securities had paid attention to it. The net effect was to invalidate the
waterfall model on which the rating agencies based the high ratings they
assigned to senior tranches of asset-backed securities: while higher-risk
collateral could still permit repayment of senior tranches if there was
enough of it and it paid something, zero-value collateral, regardless of
its nominal value, could not yield any payment to a senior tranche
170
regardless of its level of seniority.
III. THINGS FALL APART: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The threat that benefit funds face based on pre-crash transactions
has two dimensions: (1) states and state subdivisions such as cities,
hospitals, and associations of public employees have invested far too
171
little in their benefit funds to meet predictable demands; and (2) the
investments that they have made are subject to high risk of default
because they include instruments such as CDOs backed by underlying
loans that have defaulted, are in grave risk of default, or cannot
currently be valued at all because it is unclear what their base-level
collateral is worth in terms of the capacity of obligors to make
172
The
payments, or, in the absence of such payments, on foreclosure.
issues of underfunding and investment uncertainty are closely linked,
since many funds made improvident investments in order to improve
yields on the funds they received in order to be able to make future

169. See Baily et al., supra note 76, at 83 (noting that market participants and regulators
failed to manage risk at every stage of securitization); Joseph R. Mason, The (Continuing)
Information Problems in Structured Finance, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2008, at 7–8 (noting
that mortgage-backed securities will not make “subsequent recoveries that will restore
investors”); Lowenstein, supra note 116.
170. See Jeffrey A. Lenobel & Gregory P. Pressman, Mortgage-Backed Security Process
Undergoes Change, N.Y. L. J., Mar. 29, 1999, at S1 (AAA-rated senior tranche holders will
receive reduction in income to the extent that losses cannot be absorbed by subordinate
tranches); Gibson, supra note 138, at 9–11 (noting that cash CDOs require cash flow to fund
all tranches—and even senior tranches may be subordinate to deal structuring fees).
171. See Joseph De Avila, Pension Overhaul is Urged, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2012, at
A15 (noting that Connecticut, for example, is the third lowest state in pension funding, with
enough savings to cover a mere 53% of its obligations).
172. Evans, supra note 4.
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173

payments to their beneficiaries.
The CDO crisis, and effective measures both to deal with its
lingering fallout and to prevent future crises of similar origin, can be
understood only in terms of the regulatory system in place both in the
U.S. and in other countries to protect investors and financial institutions
against such events. This Article will deal particularly with U.S.
securities regulation, established in the wake of the Crash of 1929 and
the subsequent Great Depression, whose partial dismantling under the
guise of deregulation, beginning in the 1970s, helped to set the stage for
the current crisis.
A. The Crumbling Firewall: Deregulation and the Financial Crisis
Investments by benefit funds in risky securities are subject to three
major federal statutes governing the sale of securities: the Securities
174
175
176
Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Advisers Act. Each is
hedged about with regulations promulgated by the SEC and by a
framework of judicial interpretation.
Since the 1970s, deregulation, motivated largely by political
177
ideology, led to the weakening of protective statutes and regulations,
and judicial decisions that limited the scope and force of existing
regulatory law, with the result of pulling some of the teeth from the
178
aging tiger of securities regulation. Ironically, the SEC itself began the
process, first by accepting securities receiving top ratings from the credit
rating agencies as part of the capital of the brokerages that it
179
regulated,
and then, even more significantly, by its regulatory

173. See supra notes 19–24, 62–64 and accompanying text.
174. Securities Act 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
175. Exchange Act § 78a.
176. Investment Advisers Act § 80b-20.
177. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 134–36. It is significant that Judge Posner, once a
strong advocate of deregulation, agrees on this point with his one-time ideological opponent,
Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize-winning economist. See id.; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Reagan
Did It, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A21 (noting that the financial crash largely caused by
explosion of private debt due largely to financial deregulation based on political ideology
beginning in the 1980s).
178. See David S. Bieri, Regulation and Financial Stability in the Age of Turbulence, in
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 327, 331 (banking crises of the last 30 years largely due to ineffective
and complacent regulation shaped by the interference of special interests).
179. See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(F)(1) (2011); Definition of
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expansion of the small business exemptions for registration of securities
into exemptions that went well beyond the Securities Act’s purposes in
180
authorizing such exemptions.
Congress accelerated financial deregulation during the 1970s. This
began with the lifting of some key regulations on savings and loan
institutions (thrifts), at that time among the most important originators
181
of mortgages, which were regulated separately from banks. The toxic
effect of this deregulation was felt in the massive failures of deregulated
institutions, which caused a national financial crisis that spanned the
182
1980s, but this crisis did not slow the deregulatory juggernaut.
The hallowed separation between commercial and investment
183
which was the most conspicuous example of this
banking,
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8570
& 34-51572, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 (proposed Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240).
180. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1373–74. See generally SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119 (1953) (noting that exemptions apply where there is no practical need for
protection of the 1933 Act or where its benefits are too remote).
181. This deregulation was largely accomplished by the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982), which removed Depression-era
limitations on savings and loan institutions, leading to massive failures of savings and loans
beginning in the mid-1980s. See Krugman, supra note 177.
182. More financial institutions failed during the savings and loan crisis than at any time
since the Great Depression. From 1986 through 1995, the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corporation (which was itself wound up as a result of its liabilities from the crisis) and the
Resolution Trust Corporation (established by Congress to deal with the crisis) combined
closed 1,043 thrift institutions with $519 billion in assets, and the number of federally insured
thrifts in the U.S. declined by about 50%. See Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the
Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV., No. 2, 2000, at
26. The savings and loan crisis was the most famous part of a larger banking crisis in which
more than 1,600 FDIC-insured banks were closed or required financial assistance from the
FDIC. See 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE 3 (1997).
183. Commercial and investment banking were separated by one of the statutory
foundations of New Deal regulation, the Glass-Steagall Act, formally titled the Banking Act
of 1933. Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C). Glass-Steagall did far more than accomplish this separation; it included other
measures to restore confidence in the financial system, shaken by the Great Depression, such
as establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Id. § 12B(a). The
wisdom of separating commercial and investment banking has, in the context of the current
world economic crisis, been recognized outside the U.S. See Ali Qassim, U.K. Must Separate
Retail From Investment Banking to Encourage Change in Culture, INT’L BUS. & FIN. DAILY
(July 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/ms/document/XLVBTFG5GVG0 (noting that
Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, has recognized the need for such a
separation in the U.K.).
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deregulation, was abolished by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,
exposing commercial banks to the risks involved in underwriting and
dealing in securities, including the new complex breeds of securities, and
adding to risks to the entire financial system by promoting the growth of
185
too-big-to-fail financial institutions. The mischief wrought by GrammLeach-Bliley, which manifested itself in the financial crisis, went well
beyond ending the long-standing Berlin Wall between commercial and
investment banking: notably, for example, it barred the SEC from
regulating securities-based swap agreements beyond the general
186
The shackles on federal
antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
regulation of derivatives were tightened further by the Commodity
187
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which barred the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission from regulating swaps not based on
188
securities, notably including credit default risk swaps.
Beyond legal limitations placed on its authority by statute during the
thirty years preceding the financial crisis, the SEC has been chronically
starved for legal and accounting firepower, limiting its ability to assure

184. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811) (repealing sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall). The GrammLeach-Bliley Act was formally titled the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. Id.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s destruction of the wall between commercial and investment banking
has been modified by the incorporation of the “Volcker Rule” in Dodd-Frank section 619,
which at first glance appears to bar federally insured banking institutions from engaging in
proprietary trading. Dodd-Frank Act § 619(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
However, the section, read as a whole, is so permeated with the typical Dodd-Frank foam of
compromise that its real effectiveness is uncertain. Of particular concern for purposes of this
Article, Dodd-Frank section 619(g)(2) states that the section should not be construed to
prohibit an affected institution from engaging in securitization of loans. See id. § 619(g)(2).
Despite the questionable efficacy of the provision, it has come under strong partisan attack in
Congress which (a) makes it unclear whether the drafting of implementing regulations will be
funded, and (b) makes its long-term survival uncertain. See, e.g., Josh Boak, Volcker Rule
Shredded by Republicans, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0112/71602.html (noting that after agencies charged with enforcing rule released 300
pages of proposed regulations, key Republicans attacked the rule itself as a “self-inflicted
wound”).
185. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 ILL. L. REV. 215,
303–04, 446.
186. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 761–763, 766, 768.
187. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 101, 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A-452. This limitation has also been repealed, subsequent to the financial
crisis. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 713–15.
188. Commodity Futures Modernization Act app. § 3A; see Dodd-Frank Act §§ 713–15.
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compliance with the securities laws in the face of rapidly expanding
189
It has therefore generally welcomed the judicial
securities markets.
recognition of private rights of action for violations of securities statutes
190
and regulations, particularly Securities Exchange Act sections 10(b)
191
192
193
and 14(a), and the SEC’s Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 (the antifraud
194
provision of the SEC’s Proxy Rules promulgated pursuant to 14(a)).
After initially recognizing these rights of action, however, the courts
quickly reversed course, refusing to permit parties other than the SEC
to redress violations of other provisions of the securities laws through
195
litigation, unless such rights were expressly conferred by statute.
Judicial decisions have not only refused to imply new rights of action for
violation of the securities laws, but have increasingly curbed the ability
of parties other than the SEC to maintain actions under the statutes and
regulations for which private rights of action have already been
196
recognized.

189. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (SEC
stated in amicus brief that while securities markets had greatly expanded as of 1983, its own
enforcement resources had declined); Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud
Class Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330, 338 (2008) (stating that empirical studies show the SEC
cannot by itself enforce the law against all wrongdoers); Crimmins, supra note 36; Mike
Ferullo, Experts Say Missed Dodd-Frank Deadlines Increasingly Common; Lawmakers
Accept It, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 965, 965–66 (May 9, 2011) (“Some of the
regulators have a budget problem, but all of them face a talent problem in finding and hiring
new staff.”).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
191. Id. § 78n(a).
192. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
193. See Id. § 240.14a-9.
194. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (holding that shareholder
had a private right of action under the § 14(a) and the Proxy Rules). The private right of
action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was recognized by lower federal courts as early as 1946.
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). However, it was not
recognized by the Supreme Court until 1971. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1971).
195. The Supreme Court expressly refused to recognize a private right of action under
the Investment Advisers Act. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 24 (1979). The Court has also refused to recognize private rights of action under other
provisions of the securities laws such as section 17(a) of the Exchange Act. See Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979) (“§ 17(a) . . . . does not, by its terms, purport to
create a private cause of action in favor of anyone.”).
196. The Supreme Court began to restrict the ability of private plaintiffs to bring actions
under Rule 10b-5 almost immediately after recognizing it. See Affiliated UTE Citizens v.
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B. Prelude: The Credit Bubble Reaches Its Limits
Warnings that the housing bubble was unsustainable appeared at
197
The bubble continued to inflate, however.
least as early as 2004.
Benefit funds, trying to obtain 8% yields in a world where conventional
investments were paying 3%, continued to invest in complex
instruments that appeared to promise the yields they sought and sold
198
based on high ratings and dealers’ deceptive promises of safety. The
total volume of complex structured instruments being created continued
199
As the bubble reached the peak of its
to expand dramatically.
expansion, clear signs of an impending financial crisis appeared late in
2006, when U.S. housing prices first leveled off and then began to
200
The implications of this beginning of the long slide toward
decline.
economic disaster for asset-backed securities were quickly felt. By June,
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (requiring plaintiff to show “causation in fact”). More
recently, it has drawn not only upon the text of the PSLRA but on Congressional intent in
adopting the PSLRA to reduce the ability of plaintiffs other than the SEC to bring actions
under Exchange Act 10(b). See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
314, 323–24 (2007). Even where the PSLRA does not apply, the present majority on the
Court has sharply restricted implied rights of action under the securities laws to the point
where the Court has implied that it accepts their existence only because of stare decisis. See
Janus Capital Grp v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2301–03 (2011) (noting that
though existence of private right of action under Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
“remains the law,” it must be given narrow scope).
197. See SHILLER, supra note 155, at 40–41; see also Yuliya Demyanyk, Ten Myths
About Subprime Mortgages, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 87, 91 (noting that as early
as 2001–2005, “signs of the crisis brewing . . . were hidden behind a mask of rising house
prices”).
198. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 40–41 (Moody’s was slow to announce it was
changing its model for rating asset-backed securities, and actually lowering ratings, though it
was aware of the securities’ deterioration in quality); Evans, supra note 4 (“The county was
earning 8 percent in what was a 3 1/2 percent world . . . .”). Because most asset-backed
securities sold to benefit funds were unregistered, they were not subject to the SEC’s Plain
English disclosure rules, and dealers in the securities enjoyed substantial benefits from
asymmetrical information sold even to large and sophisticated funds. See Whalen, supra note
19, at 8; Arora et al., supra note 138, at 1. See generally OFFICE INVESTOR EDUC.
ASSISTANCE, supra note 58.
199. See Barth et al., supra note 1, at 97; Jon A. Garfinkel & Jarjisu Sa-Aadu, A Decade
of Living Dangerously: The Causes and Cosequences of the Mortgage, Financial, and
Economic Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 103, 103–04.
200. See Ashok Bardhan, Of Subprimes and Sundry Symptoms: The Political Economy
of the Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 17, 18.
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2007, the investment banking firm Bear Stearns, which had been
particularly aggressive in generating CDOs despite the deteriorating
quality of the underlying collateral, was forced to bail out two of its
affiliated hedge funds because of the sharp deterioration of their CDO
201
assets.
C. The Financial Crisis: The Crash of 2008
Over the next year, the depth of the developing crisis became
apparent as Bear Stearns itself spiraled toward insolvency. On March
14, 2008, the Federal Reserve provided emergency financial assistance
to keep Bear Stearns out of bankruptcy, and two days later, in an
exercise of its powers not employed since the crises of the 1930s,
provided $30 billion in backing as the venerable Wall Street firm was
202
sold at a fire-sale price to Morgan Stanley.
Despite signs of impending crisis that had multiplied during 2007,
workaround measures by the Federal Reserve and private financial
institutions working with it to save troubled institutions such as Bear
Stearns kept the slide toward world financial crisis slow and largely
203
below the radar of the financial markets until the third quarter of 2008.
By that time, subprime mortgages, which had increased from 9% of
204
newly securitized mortgages in 2001 to 40% in 2006, began to cascade
into default; it became apparent to the financial community that CDO
ratings were meaningless, and the solvency of the institutions holding
them was therefore itself questionable.
The crisis came to a head with the failure of Lehman Brothers in
2008. Lehman was “too big to fail,” both in the sense that it was so large
a component of the international financial condition that its failure
205
entailed severe consequences, and that it was too big for the Federal
201. See Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns’ Subprime Bath, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 12, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-06-12/bear-stearn
s-subprime-bathbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; Corey Hajim
& Adam Lashinsky, How Bear Stearns Lost Its Way, CNNMONEY (Aug. 21, 2007, 5:59
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/20/magazines/fortune/bear_stearns.fortune/index.htm.
202. See Associated Press, In Bear Bailout, Fed Says It Tried to Avert Contagion, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2008, at C4 (Federal Reserve assistance in bailing out Bear Stearns was
“unprecedented”).
203. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, at 118–26 (warnings about housing bubble were
initially ignored).
204. See DiMartino & Duca, supra note 160.
205. See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, REFLECTIONS ON THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT
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206

Reserve to bail out with the resources it had at hand.
The Federal
Reserve was unable to find a purchaser for the firm, and allowed it to
file for bankruptcy—the largest bankruptcy in dollar terms in U.S.
207
At this point, financial markets all over the world slid
history.
downward at a pace threatening to rival the Great Crash of 1929, as it
became clear that many large financial institutions around the world
held much of their capital in financial instruments that were either
208
worthless or impossible to value. Interbank lending, the lifeblood of
international commerce, froze because institutions worried that their
borrowers—even in the “too big to fail” class—might be insolvent. With
financial institutions around the world unable to engage in routine
short-term lending to each other, the real threat emerged as a worldwide
209
economic collapse comparable to the Great Depression of the 1930s.
As noted below, governments and central banks acted quickly and
210
drastically in attempts to contain the crisis. Their efforts, however, fell
short of dealing in full with the exigencies of the crisis, both in terms of
expenditures and in terms of regulations to stabilize the financial
environment and to prevent further crises from springing up from seeds
211
It is therefore
planted in the years leading up to the initial crisis.

MEANS: AN E-BOOK UPDATE TO THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 161
(2009) (Lehman was a major issuer of and market-maker for commercial paper).
206. See Abigail Field, Why the U.S. Balked at Bailing Out Lehman, DAILYFINANCE
(Mar. 15, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/03/15/why-the-u-s-balked-atbailout-out-lehman/.
207. Lehman filed its bankruptcy petition with about $613 billion in scheduled debt,
nearly six times as much as in the largest previously filed bankruptcy case. See Sam Mamudi,
Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 15, 2008, 10:11 AM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt.
Almost
simultaneously with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, another “too big to fail” institution,
Merrill Lynch, was pushed by the Treasury Department into acquisition by Bank of America
in order to avert a similar fate. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill is Sold: Failing to Find
Buyer, Lehman Set to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1.
208. See Posner, supra note 1, at vii–ix.
209. See Austin Murphy, The Making and Ending of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, in
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 125, 127–29. Judge Richard A. Posner (among others) has argued
that the continuing “economic downturn” following the 2007–2008 crisis should in fact be
characterized as a “depression.” See POSNER, supra note 1, at vii–x.
210. See infra notes 220–28 and accompanying text.
211. An example of the continued unfolding of the financial disaster that began in 2007
is the crisis, still unfolding as of this writing, involving both institutional and sovereign debt in
the countries that have adopted the euro as a common currency. See, e.g., Timeline: The
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necessary to discuss what has been accomplished, and what measures
are still required to deal with the damage already done and to minimize
future harm resulting from the excesses of the bubble years.
IV. THE SECURITIES LAWS AND INVESTMENTS BY BENEFIT FUNDS
A. Ad Hoc Responses: Trying to Contain the Crisis
212

The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was a “fire-bell in the night”
that precipitated a financial crisis of breadth and depth, which had not
213
Every sector of the U.S.
been seen since the great Crash of 1929.
214
economy was affected, beginning with the credit and equity markets.
In late 2008, stocks plummeted from the all-time high levels reached in
215
2007, much as they had done in 1929. The most widely followed stock
index, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, dropped almost 2,400 points
216
in eight trading days. Even more seriously, credit markets all over the
217
world froze. Because financial institutions held large portions of their
capital in the form of once highly rated CDOs, which now were worth
substantially less than their nominal value, or whose value could not be
computed at all, the institutions making up the system were reluctant to
make the short-term loans to each other that the world financial system
218
That, in turn, threatened to dry up
requires to function effectively.

Unfolding Eurozone Crisis, BBC NEWS: BUS. (Jun. 13, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://www.bbc.co.u
k/news/business-13856580.
212. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes (April 22, 1820), in 4 MEMOIRS,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332–33 (Thomas
Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829) (stating that the controversy over slavery in U.S. territories
alarmed him “like a fire-bell in the night”).
213. See POSNER, supra note 1, at vii–x, 10–17; REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 154, at
xli–xlv, 203–22, 233–39 (labeling current crisis as “the Second Great Contraction” comparable
to that following the Crash of 1929).
214. See Posner, supra note 1, at vii–ix.
215. See id. at ix–x.
216. See Kirk Shinkle, The Crash of 2008: How Bad Is It, and When Will It End?,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Oct. 17, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/personalfinance/investing/articles/2008/10/17/the-crash-of-2008.
217. See, e.g., David Goldman, Credit Freeze: What Lehman Wrought, CNNMONEY
(Nov. 16, 2008, 7:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/14/news/economy/two_months_since
_lehman/index.htm.
218. See POSNER, supra note 1, passim; Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime
Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 69, 69–70.
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credit to businesses around the world that depended on the institutions
219
for credit to keep running.
The result was a quick sequence of major interventions by Congress,
the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, and corresponding institutions
of other major financial powers to shore up endangered private financial
institutions that were “too big to fail,” and to restore liquidity to the
220
The level of commitment by
international financial system.
governments, central banks, and major private institutions to this end
was unprecedented in scope, size, and the level of international
cooperation involved, continuing across national elections that
transferred power from one political party to another.
As the U.S. government struggled to keep the national economy
from collapse, one of its first formal measures was to establish the
221
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). This program was enacted
by Congress as a monumental appropriation—$700 billion—to be used
to purchase toxic assets from the financial institutions that had
222
embedded them in their capital. The urgency of the crisis, however,
made this gradual approach appear too slow to avoid the failure of at
least some of the institutions concerned, and so the TARP was
transformed into a fund for protecting the solvency of troubled
institutions by directly extending credit to them or, in many cases,
223
The toxic assets, however,
purchasing equity interests in them.
remained part of their capital, and continued to be a latent threat both
to the institutions holding them and counterparties to swap transactions
in which the counterparties agreed to assume at least part of the risk of
219. See Goldman, supra note 217.
220. Arguably, major benefit funds, which have thousands of beneficiaries and hundreds
of billions of dollars in assets, are also “too big to fail.” Defaults by major funds, cities, or
possibly even states would have ripple effects that, like the failure of Lehman Brothers, would
threaten the already fragile national economic recovery.
221. TARP was created as the central part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (Supp. IV
2011)).
222. See id. § 115(a)(3). Dodd-Frank Act reduced the amount of troubled assets the
Department of Treasury could purchase to $475 billion. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1302, 12
U.S.C. § 5225(a)(3) (Supp. IV 2011).
223. The Treasury purchased more than $150 million in equity from fifty-two financial
institutions with TARP funds from the creation of the TARP on October 3, 2008 through
November 25, 2008. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-161, TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER ENSURE
INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 16 (2008).

12 - MENDALES FINAL PRINTER

284

12/28/2012 11:14 AM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:241

the assets involved. This continues to be a significant threat to the world
224
economy in recovering from the crisis of 2008.
In the U.S., government agencies also attempted to redraft the
regulations which had embedded ratings issued by the conflicted credit
225
As the
rating agencies in the issuance of asset-backed securities.
financial crisis moved toward its climax in 2008 and the rating agencies
scrambled to lower their high ratings on securities based on defaulting
mortgages, the SEC, for example, acknowledged that its prior use of
ratings had been ill-advised and proposed amendments to its regulations
226
that would limit their use going forward. These proposals, however,
were limited in scope. They were never implemented because the
Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2010 to deal with some of the problems
227
leading to the crash of 2008, superseded them both with self-executing
provisions and with elaborate requirements for new, far more extensive
regulations to be drafted by the SEC and other agencies dealing with
ratings to limit their use and to make them, so far as they continued to
228
be used, more reliable.
B. Incomplete Answers: The Dodd-Frank Act and Preliminary Attempts
at Regulation
With the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,

229

Congress attempted to deal

224. See Murillo Campello et al., The Long-Term Cost of the Financial Crisis, in
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 571, 577.
225. See Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, SEC Release
No. 34-61051, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,866 (proposed Dec. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240 & 249b) (proposing rules more strictly regulating rating agencies, offered for comment
before passage of Dodd-Frank); see also Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,421 (proposed
June 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249) (SEC had deferred
consideration of original rules imposing stricter regulation of rating agencies and was now
proposing new ones in response to Dodd-Frank).
226. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-58070, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11,
2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249).
227. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
228. See Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Fed. Reg. at
33,420 & n.2 (the Commission had deferred considering action on its original proposed
regulations in 2009, and was now proposing new rules mandated by Dodd-Frank Title IX,
Subtitle C, Pub. L. No. 11-203 §§ 939, 939D-939F).
229. 124 Stat. at 1376.
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comprehensively with many of the problems underlying the financial
crisis. Dodd-Frank, together with regulations being drafted by the SEC,
the CFTC, and other regulatory agencies to interpret the new statute
and to give new force to prior regulatory statutes, contain some valuable
230
provisions trapped within a mountain of verbiage. While, as we shall
see, Dodd-Frank has major limitations, it is helpful to begin by
reviewing the more effective provisions by which it attempts to deal with
the problems discussed in this Article. First, Dodd-Frank repeals
231
Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s bar to the SEC regulation of swap agreements,
and gives the SEC and CFTC jurisdiction to establish regulations that,
inter alia, require participants in swap agreements to clear them on
recognized exchanges rather than, as before, simply creating them over
232
Regulations such as these will
the counter without public records.
help regulators to ascertain the value of swaps outstanding, and thereby
help to curb the volatility of financial markets generally—though
derivatives such as swaps are inherently volatile and hard to value long233
term —so that it is unlikely that any regulatory scheme can make
instruments that include them as collateral suitable to be offered for sale
to vulnerable parties such as benefit funds.
Dodd-Frank also imposes some limits on securitization which, while
limited, improve upon prior law. The most important of these is that it
requires federal banking and securities regulators to formulate
regulations to require the sellers of asset-backed securities to retain part
of the risk of the assets such as mortgages that provide cash flow for the
234
There are several important problems with this section,
securities.
230. See id.
231. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2011).
232. Id. § 8302. Dodd-Frank Act Title VII gives the SEC jurisdiction over securitybased swaps; the CFTC jurisdiction over non-security based swaps such as those based on
currencies; and the two have joint jurisdiction over instruments involving both securities and
non-security-based swaps. Id. The agencies have begun promulgating the extensive
regulations required to do so. See, e.g., Interpretive Guidance for Cross-Border Application
of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,214 (proposed
July 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. chp. I) (CFTC guidance on the Dodd-Frank Act’s
regulation governing cross-border credit default and interest rate swap agreements); see also
Silla Brush, CFTC Proposes Swaps Clearing Determinations Under Dodd-Frank,
BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-24/cftc-proposesswaps-clearing-determinations-under-dodd-frank-act.html; Derivatives, U.S. SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N (July 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml.
233. See, e.g., Friedman & Friedman, supra note 152, at 33.
234. Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (Supp. IV 2011).
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however: it is not self-executing, and requires regulations to be drafted
by several different regulatory agencies to take effect. Moreover, it
specifies that the amount of risk retained is to be at least 5%, hardly
enough to deter investment banking firms who took on enormous levels
235
of risk during the period leading up to the 2008 debacle. Worse yet,
the retention requirement does not apply to “qualified residential
mortgages,” a term which the statute leaves to the agencies to define by
236
regulation, but which presumably will include conventional mortgages.
As we have seen, the failure of mortgage-backed securities that
triggered the financial crisis was caused not just by the use of
“subprime” mortgages, but by the steady relaxation of standards
237
required for “conventional” mortgages.
238
The SEC, in reliance on Dodd-Frank, has for the first time
extended Regulation AB to cover privately placed asset-backed
239
securities as well as those that are publicly registered. This small step
forward, however, comes to grief, like so many provisions of DoddFrank, in the discretion that it gives to those whom it purports to

235. See Friedman & Friedman, supra note 152, at 33 (noting that after SEC agreed to
let investment banks monitor their own risks in 2004, they assumed enormous new risks, with
Bear Stearns taking on a leverage ratio of 33:1 by the time of its failure).
236. Exchange Act § 15G(c)(1)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 2011)).
237. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. By contrast, the German
Pfandbriefgesetz, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, requires strict supervision of
financial institutions permitted to issue Pfandbriefe and of the collateral that backs the
instruments. Inter alia, issuing institutions retain all risk on the Pfandbriefe that they are
permitted to issue, and if mortgages collateralizing a Pfandbrief become riskier than at the
time the Pfandbrief was issued, independent trustees (“Treuh nder”) must replace them with
instruments that adequately cover the obligations evidenced by the Pfandbrief. See, e.g.,
Pfandbriefgesetz, PfandBG [Pfandbrief Act], 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] at Teil I, §§ 1–
4, 12–16, 27–28. Pfandbriefe survived the 2007–2009 crisis far better than their CMO cousins.
Ironically, the only significant crisis affecting Pfandbriefe during the world financial crisis
occurred late in 2008 not because of failure of mortgages collateralizing Pfandbriefe, but
because a leading issuer, the Hypo Real Estate Pfandbrief Bank, became enmeshed in a crisis
concerning its corporate parent, the Hypovereinsbank, because of the parent’s failed
investment in the Depfa Bank in Ireland, requiring the German government to bail out the
corporate parent. See Kofner, supra note 69, at 23–25.
238. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
239. See Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required by Section 943 of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 339175 & 34-63741, 76 Fed. Reg. 4489 (effective Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
229, 232, 240 & 249).
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240

regulate. New Rule 15Ga-1 requires securitizers—the assemblers of
241
pools of assets used to collateralize asset-backed securities —to report
incidents in which they are required to repurchase or replace collateral
242
The SEC itself, however, somewhat ruefully
that proves defective.
stated that this obligation will be triggered only if a securitizer subjects
itself to a contractual obligation to repurchase or replace assets that
prove defective, and that commentators on the proposing release had
243
noted it was unlikely to have significant effects.
Dodd-Frank also makes an elaborate but, in the last analysis, limited
attempt at protecting buyers of complex financial instruments such as
benefit funds by imposing more controls on rating agencies and the use
244
of their output than previous legislation. Most significantly, it requires
the SEC, banking regulators, and other federal agencies, to end the
required use of ratings for matters as varied as qualifying for short-form
registration of securities, and quality of required capital for financial
245
organizations ranging from broker-dealers to banks.
Furthermore, since Dodd-Frank accepts that ratings will continue to
be widely used in evaluating the quality of securities, it attempts to

240. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Ga-1 (2011).
241. See Exchange Act § 15G(a)(3). A securitizer is either: “(A) an issuer of an assetbacked security; or (B) a person who organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities
transaction by selling or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, including through an
affiliate, to the issuer.” Id.
242. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Ga-1 (2011).
243. See Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4489–91.
244. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9 (Supp. IV 2011).
245. Dodd-Frank Act § 939A requires federal agencies, within a year after enactment of
the statute, to review all use of ratings used in their regulations. Id § 78o-7. While this has in
fact taken far longer than the time required, the SEC has already adopted extensive
amendments to its rules and forms, effective September 2, 2012, which remove virtually all
use of ratings in its rules and forms, such as the use of ratings to qualify for use of the
simplified forms S-3 and F-3 for registering securities for public distribution. See Security
Ratings, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-9245 & 34-64975, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,603, 46,607
(effective Sept. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240 & 249).
The changes also include the elimination of former 17 C.F.R. section 230.134(a)(17), which
had provided a “safe harbor” for issuers to use credit ratings in communications not subject to
the rules governing prospectuses. Id. at 46,603, 46,612. As the SEC noted in removing the
“safe harbor,” the change will probably have little effect because issuers will still be able to
use ratings in free writing prospectuses, and, as we will see, the new rules that are supposed to
improve the accuracy of ratings leave almost no room for an investor to sue an issuer or rating
agency based on an inaccurate rating. See id.; see also infra notes 295–97 and accompanying
text.
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assure greater objectivity in credit ratings by requiring rating agencies,
as a condition for registration with agencies such as the SEC, to create
their own systems of internal controls to establish procedures and
246
Doddmethodologies to produce consistent and accurate ratings.
Frank requires the agencies to appoint compliance officers to assure that
each agency, in formulating its ratings, is in compliance with its own
policies, and requires the chief executive officer of each agency to attest
247
to its compliance with these policies.
Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires rating agencies to disclose their
methodologies, including mathematical models, data used to formulate
the ratings, limitations on the reliability of the ratings, and information
248
These are to be
concerning the past performance of the ratings.
provided, on standard forms to be developed by the agencies
249
These forms are supposed to be
themselves, to users of the ratings.
“easy to use and helpful for users of credit ratings to understand the
250
information contained in the report.”
All of this sound and fury signifies next to nothing, however, for a
number of reasons. Even if Dodd-Frank provides for rules imposed by
251
a body other than the agencies themselves, and is enforceable by users
of the ratings as well as the SEC, the reports it prescribes to accompany
the ratings would not likely be materially helpful to unsophisticated
users, for whom, as the experience of the last decade shows, the ratings
themselves are surrogates for due diligence on the quality of complex
securities. In the assembly of collateral for CDOs, as previously noted,
complexity led even sophisticated investment bankers to rely solely on
ratings for evaluating the chances of default on the securities based on
252
that collateral.
Even if users actually make use of the new reports required by

246. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3).
247. See id. § 78o-7(c)(3) to 7(j).
248. See id.
249. See id. § 78o-7(s).
250. Id. § 78o-7(s)(2)(a).
251. Broker-dealers, for example, are regulated by independent organizations such as
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the New York Stock Exchange as
well as the SEC. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2012); infra note 257 and
accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 70–75, 97–98 and accompanying text.
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Dodd-Frank, however, agencies face little deterrence against
formulating rules that favor themselves at the expense of their
customers, because (a) enforcement of the provisions is left exclusively
253
to the already understaffed SEC, and (b) the SEC’s authority is merely
to prescribe rules under which the agencies are to regulate themselves,
and its power to sanction misbehavior by a rating agency is largely
confined to suspension or disbarment if an agency fails to conform to its
254
own rules.
Dodd-Frank and the regulations being drafted to implement it offer
no remedy at all for the problems faced by benefit funds holding once
highly rated complex financial instruments that are now worthless,
255
sharply diminished in value, or currently impossible to value.
Furthermore, they do not address important issues concerning the
prevention of a similar debacle in the future.
Dodd-Frank, whatever its use going forward, does nothing to
remove barriers to actions by parties other than federal agencies based
256
It therefore does not aid benefit
on transactions already completed.
funds and their state sponsors in bringing actions for frauds committed
before the financial crisis. Moreover, it adds little to the enforcement
powers of the SEC, other federal regulators, and self-regulating
257
organizations such as FINRA in bringing such actions.
More basically, Dodd-Frank, as it currently stands, is immensely
258
In attempting to deal with the
complex, running 2,300 pages.
multitude of problems that became manifest with the 2008 financial
crisis, it incorporates provisions that deal with matters ranging from
253. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(q)–(s); Levitt, supra note 33.
254. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)–(d).
255. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S.C).
256. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270, 280 (1994) (noting that there
is a strong presumption against retroactive application of a statute unless retroactivity is
expressly stated by Congress). A SEC administrative law judge, addressing an initial attempt
by the SEC to apply Dodd-Frank, held that substantive provisions of Dodd-Frank do not
apply retroactively. See Lawton, Release No. 419, File No. 3-14162 (ALJ Apr. 29, 2011)
(initial decision).
257. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority is an independent corporation (the
successor to the National Association of Securities Dealers), which, under the general
supervision of the SEC, acts as a self-regulatory organization for securities brokers and
dealers. See Carrie Johnson, SEC Approves One Watchdog for Brokers Big and Small,
WASH. POST, July 27, 2007, at D1.
258. See Levitt, supra note 33.
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consumer protection to the regulation of rating agencies. Because of
this attempt at being comprehensive, and the compromises that went
into achieving its wide scope, it lacks the conciseness and consistent
legislative architecture that have made legislation such as the Securities
259
Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 effective tools for securities
260
regulation, and often falls short of real effectiveness in matters of
concern to this Article, such as regulation of the rating agencies. DoddFrank, and particularly the sections of its Title IX that apply to rating
261
agencies, are so prolix, indirect, and lacking in force as to fit the Court
of Claims’ characterization of the 1959 Life Insurance Company Income
262
Tax Act as a “conspiracy in restraint of understanding.” Moreover, to
an even greater degree than earlier securities law, Dodd-Frank depends
upon interpretive regulations, which are being drafted—with
considerable difficulty—by multiple administrative agencies, for its
263
It is also subject to ongoing hostility in Congress that
enforcement.
could result in the revision or repeal of some of its provisions, and which
could also deter administrative agencies from drafting interpretive
regulations as forceful as regulations already in effect under older
264
federal statutes concerning securities. Because of this, it adds little to
the protection given to future buyers of complex securities by previously
enacted statutes.
Dodd-Frank, more than prior legislation, gives the appearance of
attempting to deal with the problems associated with the credit rating
265
It requires the SEC to establish within itself an Office of
agencies.
259. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (Supp. IV 2011).
260. In a current compilation, the entire 1933 Act, including almost eighty years of
amendments, runs approximately forty-seven pages. HAZEN, supra note 47, at 1–47.
261. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text
262. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 582 F.2d 579, 583 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
263. The CFTC, for example, voted to delay its rulemaking for key portions of DoddFrank (other than those that are self-executing) until at least the end of 2011, more than six
months after the deadline in the Act. See CFTC Proposes Six-Month Delay for Bulk of
Dodd-Frank Swaps Rulemaking, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (June 15, 2011).
264. See Levitt, supra note 33 (Congressional Republicans, as part of their general
hostility to the securities laws, have deliberately underfunded the S.E.C.’s statutorily required
efforts to promulgate regulations for enforcement of Dodd-Frank); see, e.g., T.W. Farnam,
Payday Lenders Writing Bigger Checks to Candidates, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2012, at A13;
Newt Gingrich, Opinion, Reagan Had the Recipe for Success. Let’s Follow It, WALL ST. J.,
December 29, 2011, at A15; Peter J. Wallison, Opinion, How Regulators Herded Banks into
Trouble, WALL ST. J., December 3–4, 2011, at A17.
265. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (Supp. IV 2011).
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Credit Ratings to administer the rules that it authorizes the SEC to draft
concerning credit rating agencies, and to “promote accuracy” in the
266
ratings. It also contains some useful provisions for disclosure by rating
267
These provisions,
agencies on their practices in formulating ratings.
however, lack real teeth.
Dodd-Frank provides, somewhat deceptively, for regulatory agency
input in supervising what is essentially a scheme of self-regulation by the
credit rating agencies. To do so, inter alia, it mandates the creation
268
Substantively,
within the SEC of an Office of Credit Ratings.
however, though it anticipates that ratings will continue to be used,
particularly in privately placed offerings, it approaches abuses by credit
269
rating agencies obliquely rather than directly. Its immense complexity
is a source of weakness rather than strength. It is partly self-executing,
and partly relies on studies to be made and regulations to be
promulgated by eight different federal agencies—the Treasury, Federal
270
271
272
273
274
Reserve, SEC, CFTC, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, plus a new Bureau of Consumer
275
Protection.
Worse yet, though it gives the SEC some authority over the credit
276
rating agencies, an important point for the concerns of this Article, it

266. Id. § 78o-7(p)(1)(A)(ii).
267. See supra notes 225–33, 245–50 and accompanying text.
268. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)(1).
269. See supra notes 222–32, 253–54 and accompanying text.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(2).
271. Id. § 8302(a)(1).
272. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5391(d) (Supp. IV 2011).
273. The Federal Housing Finance Administration, successor agency to the Office of
Federal Housing Oversight and conservator for the formerly independent Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac following their insolvency. See About FHFA, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=4 (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
274. The National Credit Union Administration is given authority by the Federal Credit
Union Act, enacted by Congress in 1934. Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1751
(2006).
275. Dodd-Frank requires the SEC alone to establish 5 new offices, conduct more than
20 studies, and draft more than 100 sets of rules. See Oversight of Dodd-Frank
Implementation: A Progress Report by the Regulators at the Half-Year Mark: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Aff., 112th Congress 1 (2011) (statement of Mary
L. Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission).
276. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (Supp. IV 2011).
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leaves in place Exchange Act section 15E(c)(2), inserted by the
278
retrograde Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA),
which bars not only the SEC but any State from regulating the agencies’
procedures, methodologies, or the substance of credit ratings, except in
279
indirect ways. While Dodd-Frank has elaborate provisions requiring
rating agencies to establish procedures for formulating ratings, and
280
requires that these procedures be documented and disclosed, it does
not permit regulatory agencies to play a direct role in formulating the
281
ratings that the agencies place upon securities. Moreover, it preserves
the exclusive authority given to the SEC by CRARA to enforce
provisions of the securities laws dealing with rating agencies, if the
agencies materially fail to conform to the procedures for rating
282
securities prescribed by Dodd-Frank and other litigation.
Dodd-Frank does allow a private right of action against rating
agencies under extremely limited circumstances: where the complainant
277. Id. § 78o-7(c)(2).
278. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 15E(c)(2),
120 Stat. 1332 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)).
279. See Exchange Act § 15E(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2) (2006); Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64514, 76 Fed.
Reg. 33,420, 33,429 (proposed June 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249);
see also, Mark Twain (“A lie is like a cat. It never comes at you straight.”). Mark Twain is
one of my favorite writers, and I have read so much of his writing (and reminiscences by
people who knew him) that I cannot pinpoint the specific sources of this quote, although I am
confident of its accuracy. In fairness, Twain was intensely fond of cats, something that could
not be said of his feelings toward Congress. See CONNIE ANN KIRK, MARK TWAIN: A
BIOGRAPHY 117 (“Reader, suppose you were a member of Congress. And suppose you were
an idiot. But I repeat myself.”).
280. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2011); Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,421–22.
281. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2). While Dodd-Frank states that the SEC may prescribe
factors that an NRSRO should take into consideration in establishing, maintaining, enforcing,
and documenting, an effective internal control system, the SEC’s role is permissive rather
than mandatory, and the primary responsibility is still placed with the rating agency itself. See
id. § 78o-7(c)(3)(A). This sharply contrasts with the direct role played by the SEC in
overseeing regulation of broker-dealers by independent agencies such as securities exchanges
and FINRA. See Exchange Act § 4, 6, 19. The SEC, as of August 8, 2011, deferred such
prescription indefinitely pending observation of actual formulation by the rating agencies of
their own internal control structures, illustrating in part the futility of doing so, given the
complexity of the task in proportion to SEC resources, and the ultimate self-regulatory
authority allowed the agencies under Dodd-Frank. See Rules for Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,420–22.
282. See Exchange Act § 15E(c)(1) (preserving any action “by the Commission” under
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws).
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is injured by a rating that was prepared by an agency in knowing or
recklessly disregarding its own procedures for formulating ratings, or of
283
It is, however, even more
information used in rating a security.
restrictive than the PSLRA in establishing high barriers that pleadings
in such actions must overcome to allow them to proceed to discovery,
284
making the right almost meaningless. In the first place, the pleading
barrier applies not just to class action plaintiffs, but to all plaintiffs,
285
Secondly, it bars any action from
including public benefit funds.
proceeding as far as discovery unless the plaintiff’s pleadings establish
“a strong inference” that the agency, in preparing the rating, failed to
comply with its own procedures, or to obtain “reasonable verification”
of factual elements of the rating from sources other than the issuer or
underwriter “that the credit rating agency considered to be competent”
286
The near-complete discretion
concerning the security being rated.
given agencies to choose the methods and facts they use to rate
securities makes it difficult to envision circumstances under which a
plaintiff could overcome the pleading barrier to state a claim.
While Dodd-Frank requires federal agencies to remove formal
283. New SEC Rule 17g-7 requires NRSROs to disclose, as part of the report
accompanying their ratings of asset-backed securities, any representations, warranties, and
enforcement mechanisms available to investors under the rating agencies’ own internal
procedures, and how they differ from the representations, warranties, and enforcement
mechanisms under similar securities—but since these are left almost entirely to the discretion
of the agencies themselves, the rule is deceptively meaningless. See Disclosure for AssetBacked Securities Required by Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-9175 & 34-63741, 76 Fed. Reg.
4504 (effective Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229, 232, 240 & 249).
284. Dodd-Frank § 939G, at first glance, seems to give non-agency claimants stronger
claims against NRSROs for misleading ratings by repealing 1933 Act Rule 436(g). DoddFrank Act § 939G. This rule provided that when a rating was referred to in a registration
statement for securities, the NRSRO that issued it would not be considered an expert
participating in the registration process for purposes of liability under 1933 Act section 11.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2012). Dodd-Frank, in repealing Rule 436(g), established that
NRSROs would not be considered experts for purposes of section 11 liability unless they file
a written consent to the inclusion of the rating in the registration statement. Dodd-Frank Act
§ 929P. This is likely to have little impact because (1) most of the securities this Article
addresses are exempt from registering, and (2) the rating agencies have indicated they will
not give the requisite consents. See Gregory A. Fernicola et al., Dodd-Frank Act
Rescinds Exemptions Under Rule 436(g), SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM
LLP & AFFILIATES (July 23, 2010), http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&item
ID=2172.
285. See Exchange Act § 21D.
286. Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011).
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requirements that ratings be used in evaluating the creditworthiness of
securities, it leaves individual federal agencies to provide for substitutes
287
by regulation. The SEC and other regulatory agencies have begun to
comply with this directive by promulgating new rules to remove
288
references to ratings by the NRSROs from their regulations, but they
have not come up with adequate substitutes, nor is it clear that it is
possible to do what the ratings purported to do—i.e., to predict
performance by complex securities over more than a short period of
289
time.
Moreover, Dodd-Frank and its regulatory progeny do little to
protect investors such as benefit funds who rely on ratings for their
investments. Its treatment of the conflicts of interest created by the
agencies’ payment by the issuers of securities they are rating is typical of
its soft approach to hard problems. Instead of taking as its model the
stringent provisions created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in dealing with
290
conflicts of interest by auditors, it merely provides for a paper-thin
separation between the agency employees who sell their agencies’

287. The SEC, inter alia, has removed investment grade ratings as requirements for the
registration of primary offerings of non-convertible, non-equity securities for cash on short
forms S-3 and F-3 (as compared to the much longer forms S-1 and F-1 used for offering nonqualifying securities), and substituted a requirement that the issuer have issued at least $1
billion in non-convertible, non-equity securities registered under the 1933 Act over the prior
three years, or meet certain other transaction history requirements. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405,
239.13 (2012); Security Ratings, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-9245 & 34-64975, 76 Fed.
Reg. 46,603, 46,606–10 (effective Sept. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230,
232, 239, 240 & 249); SEC, Form F-3: Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of
1933, General Instructions, § I.B.2; SEC, Form S-3: Registration Statement Under the
Securities Act of 1933, General Instructions, § I.B.2.
288. See, e.g., Security Ratings, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,603 (removing references to security
ratings from rule and form requirements under the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act per
Dodd-Frank § 939A); Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 77 Fed. Reg. 53,060,
53,061–62 & n.9 (Aug. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225 & 325) (a joint
final rule removing references to ratings for evaluating creditworthiness per Dodd-Frank
§ 939A).
289. Many comments made to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on its
proposed rules to replace ratings with complex economic models noted that most community
and regional banks did not have systems and staff capable of performing analyses at the level
of credit rating agencies—and the same is, if anything, more true of all but the most
sophisticated benefit funds. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. at 53,062–63.
290. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 103, 208(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7213, 7233 (2006)
(making it unlawful for a registered public accounting firm or any person associated therewith
to prepare or issue an audit report concerning an issuer of securities if subject to a conflict of
interest as defined in Exchange Act § 10A(g)).
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services and those who actually rate securities. It takes little analytic
skill to see that agency employees who formulate ratings are aware that
their agencies are paid by the issuers of the securities they are rating.
Thus, these agencies depend on good relations with the small circle of
financial institutions that underwrite the securities for their revenues,
whether or not they have direct contact with those who sell the agencies’
services. It is this systemic conflict of interest, rather than the individual
conflicts of interest of agency employees that Dodd-Frank seeks to
control, which provided the incentive for the deceptively positive ratings
issued for complex financial instruments such as CDOs by the rating
292
agencies during the New Gilded Age.
Another Dodd-Frank provision that superficially appears to
encourage agency objectivity in formulating ratings similarly falls short
of real effectiveness. This is the requirement that an agency, in
formulating a rating, shall rely on information from a source that it
293
considers reliable other than the security’s issuer or underwriter. This
is deceptively meaningless because the source must be one that the
rating agency itself considers credible—and by leaving the decision on
credibility to the agency itself, renders virtually unenforceable a claim
that the agency failed to rely on truly objective evidence. The vaporous
nature of the provision is highlighted by considering what third-party
sources a rating agency could rely upon to provide such information—
given that the only parties likely to have the resources to perform the
kind of “due diligence” to which the statute refers, in the context of
294
examination by agencies of third-party data, are the small circle of
financial institutions that share a mutual interest in assuring that
291. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2011); Rules for
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, at 33,426.
292. See Complaint at 11–19, Illinois v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. 12 CH-02535 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 25, 2012); Michael Bologna, Illinois AG Accuses S&P of Fraud in Ratings of Structured
Finance Securities, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 231 (Jan. 30, 2012) (Illinois sued
S&P in state court under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and Uniform Deceptive Practices
Act, claiming that, in the ratings it gave structured finance securities sold to state agencies, S
& P systematically misrepresented its credit analysis of the securities as objective when it in
fact ignored their true risks to secure business from the securities’ underwriters).
293. Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(v) (Supp. IV 2011).
294. Exchange Act § 15E(s)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (Supp. IV 2011). The statute’s use of
the term “due diligence” is itself deceptive in that it falsely implies that providers of such
information will be subject to the kind of liability to which an underwriter would be subject
under Securities Act section 11(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 77a, 77k(b) (2006), for failure to
perform due diligence, when Dodd-Frank in fact does not impose such liability.
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complex securities receive good ratings.
Even the requirement that the SEC prescribe a short form on which
rating agencies are to be required to provide ratings users with the
assumptions and methodologies underlying the procedures used in
295
formulating ratings, and the data used in preparing particular ratings,
may ironically prove counterproductive. Given the complexity of the
mathematical models used to formulate ratings, one can be sure that
they will add little or nothing to the ability of fiduciaries for all but the
296
largest benefit funds to understand what the ratings mean, and smaller
fund fiduciaries are more likely to simply look at the rating itself, and
erroneously take confidence from the analytical apparatus provided by
297
the forms that the rating can be relied upon.
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Two problems must be addressed in dealing with losses incurred by
public benefit funds before the losses escalate into a new dimension of
the financial crisis that could prove comparable to or even more severe
than the failure or threatened failure of great private financial
298
institutions. The first is to enable them to recover losses by rescinding
transactions or recovering damages from financial institutions that led
them down the primrose path to improvident investments. The second
is to put in place a framework of regulation that will make it more
difficult for benefit funds to put themselves in this kind of financial
jeopardy in the future.
Recoveries of losses—both those already realized and those that are
still latent—will require enforcement of statutes and regulations

295. Exchange Act § 15E(s).
296. Even the most sophisticated investors may be unable to overcome the high level of
information asymmetry they suffer as against sellers of complex financial instruments. See
Arora et al., supra note 138 (noting that the use of derivatives in financial products increases
information asymmetry between sellers and buyers so that even a buyer with substantial
information and great computational power cannot adequately compute their value).
297. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose . . . Nothing, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 22, 2012, at SR1
(noting that elaborate required disclosure is rarely read by its intended recipients, and instead
tends to be used by its providers to show compliance with disclosure law and thereby avoid
legal liability).
298. As this Article has previously noted, the ripple effects of large-scale insolvencies of
public benefit funds could lead to a national financial crisis on the order of the threatened
failure of major private financial institutions in 2008. See supra notes 15–18 and
accompanying text.
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designed for this purpose. Given the comparatively small size of the
299
SEC’s Enforcement Division, this enforcement will require actions by
states and individual funds as well as federal agency actions under the
securities laws. This, in turn, will require clarifying regulations designed
to encourage meritorious actions being brought by benefit funds under
the federal securities laws, dispelling the penumbra of deterrence
created by the PSLRA that has driven securities fraud actions into the
uncertain and inconsistent forums provided by the state courts. The
regulations should also make it possible for benefit funds to maintain
actions in the federal courts based on statutory provisions that have
heretofore been the exclusive preserve of the SEC. The fact that the
benefit funds are sponsored by states, state instrumentalities, and
organizations of state employees will be useful in drafting regulations
that gain effectiveness by furthering collaboration between the SEC and
state agencies.
A. Enforcement: Regulations in Aid of Benefit Funds for Pre-Crisis
Investments
The first concern in addressing the problems faced by benefit funds
with respect to investments in complex instruments, which are now nonperforming and either worthless or at least unsalable is to recover losses
incurred when their purchase of the instruments in question was based
on material misrepresentations or omissions by their vendors. There are
good arguments for addressing such wrongs through action by the SEC.
These include the special expertise of the SEC’s Enforcement Division;
the fact that the SEC can make use of statutes such as the Advisers Act,
300
which are not privately enforceable; and the fact that enforcement by
the SEC would create more uniform national rules. Unfortunately, as
has been noted, the SEC lacks staffing and financial resources to address
301
all but the most serious cases of securities fraud.

299. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
300. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195–97, 203 (1963)
(noting that Advisers Act section 206(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, imposes a fiduciary duty on
investment advisers requiring them to disclose all material information to clients and
prospective clients—including public benefit funds).
301. See, e.g., supra note 36.
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B. Enforcement: Giving Statutes Regulatory Teeth
The SEC has—unfortunately well after much of the damage was
done—taken action against abuses by investment advisers who allegedly
fattened themselves in violation of the Advisers Act during the period
302
leading up to the financial crisis. It has brought actions against parties
accused of violating the Act, and formed a new unit within the
303
Enforcement Division to specialize in violations of the Act.
Nonetheless, the unit consists of a total of just sixty-five professionals—
enough to bring some high-profile cases but not nearly enough to deal
304
with abuses during the prelude to the crisis, let alone the future.
305
Dodd-Frank, despite the weaknesses described above, suggests a
viable approach, even though the legislation only takes some
preliminary steps in that direction: The SEC can multiply the
effectiveness of its professionals by working with the states. DoddFrank does this, inter alia, by amending section 203A of the Advisers
Act to provide that investment advisers with less than $100 million
under management must be registered with and examined by their home
states, and barring advisers in this group from registering with the
306
More significantly, the Advisers Act authorizes the SEC to
SEC.
provide training and other reasonable assistance to state authorities in
307
These
connection with the regulation of investment advisers.
provisions, however, are limited by barring the states from bringing
enforcement actions against larger advisers that are required to register
with the SEC, except for “fraud, pricing, and reporting violations,”
implying that state enforcement in these cases requires proof of scienter,
308
a requirement to which the SEC is not subject.
This suggests that more systematic cooperation between the SEC
and the states across the entire spectrum of securities regulation would
provide an effective way to allocate scarce resources to protect state
instrumentalities such as benefit funds. A first step in establishing a

302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See supra notes 223–25, 263–73, 279–86 and accompanying text.
306. See Dodd-Frank Act § 410, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (Supp. IV 2011); Advisers Act
§ 203A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006).
307. Advisers Act § 203A(d).
308. See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 643 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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closer working relationship between the SEC and the states would be to
split off a new Office of State Coordination from the SEC’s present
Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, which presently
engages in the largely futile exercise of attempting to conduct liaison
309
with Congress. The new office would amplify the effectiveness of the
SEC staff by arranging for it to coordinate the drafting of regulations for
the protection of state instrumentalities such as benefit plans, providing
training in securities enforcement for state professionals, and
coordinating enforcement actions on behalf of such agencies with state
attorneys general and other legal officers. Moreover, it would help state
agencies by providing regular procedures to notify the SEC of the need
for enforcement action, thereby helping to place the investigative
powers of the SEC at their disposal, and enabling the state agencies to
make use of enforcement powers reserved by current law to the SEC,
310
such as those created by the Advisers Act and other federal statutes
311
such as section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act.
In addition to multiplying the effectiveness of SEC enforcement, this
coordination strategy would also help to ensure uniformity in the
creation and enforcement of antifraud regulations affecting state benefit
funds, by centering them on common federal standards rather than
relying on inconsistent state legislation and state court interpretations of
312
More effective enforcement, based on uniform
such legislation.
309. See Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N
(Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/olia.htm.
310. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006) (imposing a
fiduciary duty on investment advisers requiring them to disclose all material information to
clients and prospective clients—including public benefit funds); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194–97 (1963). The SEC has made use of the Advisers
Act to obtain settlements from dealers who fail to disclose risks in complex financial
instruments—including conflicts of interests on the part of dealers who had taken short
positions on the instruments they were selling—to clients. See Credit Suisse Alt. Capital,
LLC, SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 9268, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release
No. 3302, at 13–14 (ALJ Oct. 19, 2011).
311. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)–(3). The SEC has found section 17(a)(2) and (3) to be
effective weapons against misrepresentations in the issuance of securities because, unlike the
more famous section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, based on § 10(b), they allow
relief without requiring the agency to prove scienter—willful or reckless misrepresentations or
omissions. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695–700 (1980).
312. State enforcement actions based on securities violations rose by 51% from 2009 to
2010 alone. See State Enforcement of Securities Violations in 2010 Up 51 Percent over
Previous Year, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 2228 (Oct. 31, 2011). Lack of
uniformity in the application of state law to actions based on alleged securities fraud is a
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standards, will not only help benefit funds recover losses from prior
investments, but should have a deterrent effect against future abuses.
C. Rethinking Exemption from Registration for Asset-Backed Securities
One of the basic problems created by deregulation beginning in the
1970s, which helped lead unsophisticated managers of state and local
benefit funds down the primrose path to the purchase of asset-backed
securities, is that securities may be privately placed with such funds—
313
exempt from registration with the SEC, and therefore, from the
stringent disclosure and due diligence obligations imposed on
314
The
participants in the issuance of securities by the Securities Act.
315
exemptions have been created both by the Securities Act itself and
316
pursuant to SEC regulations based on the statute.
Rule 506 is the final part of the SEC’s Regulation D, the most
important of several regulations exempting the sale of certain securities
from the general requirement that new securities be registered with the
317
SEC before they can be sold. The Regulation D exemptions, based on
the less specific exemptions provided by Securities Act sections 3 and
318
4, have a dual purpose: to relieve small and startup businesses from
the considerable burden of registering their securities under the
Securities Act, and to relieve the already overtaxed SEC staff from the
need to review the offering materials for securities not intended for
319
general distribution for registration. Like the other exemptions from
registration, it was not intended to make serious inroads upon the Act’s
primary purpose—to insure full and fair disclosure concerning new
securities to protect unsophisticated investors from the kind of securities
problem not only in cases involving public benefit funds but also for private class actions, the
primary target of the PSLRA, which have been brought in state courts in increasing
numbers—a trend that has accelerated since 2005. See Study: More M&A Class Actions Filed
in State Courts than in Federal Courts, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 25, at 1277 (June
20, 2011) (abstract available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856695).
313. See supra notes 179–80, 314–17, 322–23 and accompanying text.
314. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
315. See id. § 77d(4).
316. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(1), .506(a) (2012).
317. See id. § 230.506.
318. HAZEN, supra note 47, at 185.
319. See infra notes 336–40 and accompanying text; see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119 (1953) (noting that exemptions apply where there is no practical need for
protection of the 1933 Act or its benefits are too remote).
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fraud which was discussed in ample detail by the Congress that enacted
320
the Securities laws in the wake of the great stock market crash of 1929.
Rather, it was designed to facilitate the sale of securities by small and
start-up businesses without requiring the substantial time and expense
321
required for registration under the Securities Act.
Rule 506 differs from the other exemptive provisions of Regulation
D (Rules 404 and 405) in that it allows the issuance of unregistered
securities without regard to their aggregate offering price if all persons
to whom they are sold are accredited investors, as defined in Rule
322
It is here that the devil gets into the details: First, public
501(a).
benefit funds with assets of $5 million or more, who are currently
323
considered accredited investors by Regulation D, are not necessarily
more sophisticated than the general public in their ability to assess the
risk of securities offered to them. Andrew Kolotay, a financial advisor
with a Ph.D. in mathematics, testified at an SEC hearing that most
municipal decision makers did not have sufficient skills to evaluate even
comparatively simple swap transactions, and were therefore, even in the
absence of fraud by their vendors, frequently overcharged by swap
324
advisers and dealers.
Moreover, including smaller benefit funds in the class of persons to
whom securities can be offered without meeting the requirements for
registration does not serve the chief purpose of the Securities Act’s
intent in providing exemptions of this kind. This is to allow investors in
small and startup businesses—both the founders of such businesses and
venture capitalists who are able to understand the risks of such
investments and, unlike benefit funds, able to absorb them—the chance
to invest in such businesses without incurring the substantial costs of
325
registration.
Regardless of the exemption employed, smaller benefit funds suffer
320. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
321. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
& MATERIALS 78–79, 332–33 (12th ed. 2012).
322. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
323. See id. § 230.501–.506.
324. See SEC Hearing on the State of Municipal Securities Market, supra note 20, at 1–2,
7. On the other hand, large funds, such as CALPERS, have substantial expertise concerning
complex securities, although even they are subject to pressures by beneficiaries and political
officials to seek higher yields at the expense of safety. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 4.
325. See HAZEN, supra note 47, at 187–88, 202–07.
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from several vulnerabilities in being allowed to purchase unregistered
326
securities. First, as noted above, their managers lack the sophistication
to understand the risks of complex securities that are difficult even for
experts to evaluate. Generally, the only basis they have had for judging
the quality of their investments has been ratings, which have proven
327
unsatisfactory for reasons already explained, and whose deficiencies
are not adequately addressed by Dodd-Frank and agency regulations
328
based on it.
The exemption from registration also means that issuers and persons
involved in the issuance of complex securities are not bound by the due
329
diligence requirements of Securities Act section 11, nor are they
330
subject to more than minimal disclosure requirements. Since they are
331
not subject to the SEC’s Plain English Rules, the disclosure of risks in
any security privately placed with them pursuant to the exemptions,
even in the absence of deliberate fraud, can be hidden in obfuscatory
language that can be puzzling even to specialists in securities law.
Moreover, of particular concern to smaller funds, unregistered securities
are less liquid than registered securities, even if they are later registered
or are resold pursuant to one of the SEC’s exemptions permitting the
332
resale of unregistered securities.
333
There are three possible ways to remedy this situation. The first
would be to exclude benefit funds entirely from the class of investors to

326. See id.
327. See supra notes 113–30, 138–42 and accompanying text (analyzing the unreliability
of ratings).
328. See supra notes 251–97 and accompanying text (analyzing why Dodd-Frank and
regulations based thereon are inadequate to assure that ratings will provide accurate
assessments of the risks in complex financial instruments being rated).
329. See Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2006).
330. See id. § 77k(b)(3).
331. Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R pt. 228, 229, 230, 239, 274).
332. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e. Even if public funds qualify for a resale exemption such as that
in 1933 Act § 4(1), which is less than clear under case law, see, e.g., SEC v. Guild Films Co.,
279 F.2d 485, 489–90 (2d Cir. 1960), they would still be illiquid for lack of a ready market.
333. Dodd-Frank gives backhanded recognition to the problems inherent in offering
exemptions to accredited investors by repealing the 1933 Securities Act § 4(a)(5), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(5), see Dodd-Frank § 944(a)(1), but that exemption, which applied solely to the offering
of securities with aggregate values of less than $5 million to accredited investors, was far less
significant than the exemption of securities without limitations on value established by Rule
506.
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whom securities may be sold without registration under the Securities
Act. This would require two changes: the definition of accredited
investor in Rule 501(a)(1) would be amended by striking the language
“any plan established and maintained by a state, its political
subdivisions, or any agency or instrumentality of a state or its political
subdivisions, for the benefit of its employees, if such plan has total assets
334
in excess of $5,000,000.” To complete this exclusion, Congress would
need to amend Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) to eliminate the accreditation of this
category of purchaser, without regard to the value of its assets, from
those purchasers to whom an offering could be made subject to the
exemption.
An alternative approach would be to permit only the largest, and
presumably the best-advised and most sophisticated, funds, to take
advantage of the exemption, while barring its use by smaller and less
sophisticated funds. This could be done, for example, by raising the
lower limit for fund assets to $100 million, a level that would support the
retention of bond counsel by the funds. Doing this would further one of
the original purposes of Rule 506—to reduce the number of SEC
335
This approach, however, would be less satisfactory than the
filings.
first. This is because experience has shown that even the most
sophisticated funds, such as CALPERS and the Texas Teachers Fund,
suffered losses from improvident investments in complex financial
336
This is partly due to the opacity of disclosure private
instruments.
placement memoranda for securities not subject to registration, and
perhaps more because even the largest funds are subject to political
pressures and pressures from their beneficiaries to raise yields on their
investments—possibly to unreasonably high levels—in order to reduce
337
required contributions by state agencies and beneficiaries.
A third and simpler approach would be to design a special
exemption for benefit funds, while barring the private placement of
securities with them under Rule 506. Under this approach, “well-known
338
seasoned issuers” would be permitted to make private placements of
334. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (2012).
335. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 4–5, 23–24, 62–66 and accompanying text.
338. “Well-known seasoned issuers” are defined by Rule 405 under 17 C.F.R.
section 230.405, as large, experienced issuers with a worldwide market for their securities,
which have a history of compliance with the securities laws.
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conventional debt and equity securities with larger benefit funds, but
would be required to make the same kind of Plain English disclosure of
340
risks now required on registration statements under the Securities Act.
Plain English disclosure of risks in order of the degree of danger they
pose to investors will provide significantly more information to potential
purchasers than simple ratings. This approach would be a substantial
improvement over reliance on ratings in aiding potential purchasers to
understand the risks posed by complex financial instruments, giving
them more of the security provided by purchasing registered securities,
while also serving the Regulation D purposes of facilitating capital
formation and relieving the SEC of the burden of having to review an
augmented number of registration statements.
D. Amplifying Disclosure: Borrowing from the FDA
The credit-rating agencies have clearly proven themselves
inadequate to give benefit funds adequate warning of unsuitable risks in
the CDO market. CRARA did not even attempt a meaningful reform
of the agencies’ business model, in which they are paid by the issuers of
341
the securities that they rate, and Dodd-Frank does not adequately deal
with this problem. While it would prove helpful to give the agencies a
due diligence obligation in formulating their ratings that resembles that
342
assumed by other participants in the issuance of securities, there are
three obstacles that stand in the way of making such duties effective in
protecting public benefit funds against unwise investments in
unconventional securities: (1) many of these securities may be sold to
343
benefit funds without registration under the Securities Act, a problem
that would be addressed by the reform of Regulation 506 described
339. While, as we have seen, size alone does not guarantee sophistication on the part of
a benefit fund, a fund managing at least $500 million in assets is better able to afford the risks
inherent in holding unregistered securities than the present, ludicrously low limit of $5 million
in current Rule 506. Of course, state legislatures and regulators would also be free to require
that state-affiliated benefit funds hold only registered securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501.
340. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
341. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1385–87; David Ellis, Rating the Rating Agencies,
CNNMONEY (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.money.cnn.com/2009/04/14/news/companies/rating_
agencies/index.htm (critics asserted—before enactment of Dodd-Frank—that attempted
reforms of the credit rating agencies had not fixed the industry).
342. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1412–13.
343. See SEC, Form S-8: Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933,
General Instructions; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501–.506.
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above; (2) present national politics indicate that it is not legislatively
possible to amend the Securities Act so as to include credit rating
agencies among the parties required to perform due diligence in the
issue of new securities—a step that Dodd-Frank carefully avoids; and
(3) the credit rating agencies’ pockets are not deep enough to make
whole public benefit funds injured by cutting corners in the rating
process.
Realizing this, the SEC has, in its proposed rulemaking authority
under Dodd-Frank, proposed to eliminate ratings by the agencies from
the process of issuing asset-backed financial instruments wherever
344
345
Not only is this required by Dodd-Frank, but it makes
possible.
sense as a matter of policy. This is true both because instruments more
complex than basic RMBS may not be susceptible to meaningful rating,
346
even in the absence of the conflicts faced by rating agencies, and so the
use of ratings, however formulated, may be inherently deceptive as to
the risks inherent in a rated security. Disposing with ratings, however,
leaves open the question of how benefit funds, especially smaller and
less sophisticated ones, are to deal with the problem of correlating yield
with risk when offered new instruments with temptingly high yields. As
suggested above, a first step would be to amend Rule 506 to eliminate
smaller and less sophisticated funds from eligibility for private
placements, which would have the dual effect of making them eligible
for relief for material misstatements and omissions in offering materials
under the more relaxed standards of the Securities Act, and to give their
347
investments the additional liquidity provided by SEC registration.
This leaves the problem of protecting larger funds, which despite their
size have still been victimized by material misrepresentations and
348
omissions in deliberately opaque offering memoranda.
The traditional approach of requiring full and fair disclosure under
the 1933 and Exchange Acts suggests a promising approach to this

344. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.
346. This is because the complexity of the mathematical models used in formulating
ratings may be chaotic in nature. This would make any deviation from initial assumptions
used in the rating process in the performance of the collateral and structure of a complex
financial instrument lead to unpredictably large changes in the probability of eventual default.
See Arora, et al., supra note 138, at 2.
347. See supra notes 333–34 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
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thicket of political and practical problems. The sellers of derivative
obligations to municipal entities would be required to follow the SEC’s
Plain English rules, governing disclosure in prospectuses issued to
349
investors since 1998, in describing how the securities worked and how
the benefits derived by all entities concerned with their issuance. This
would include clearly drafted “Risk Factor” sections that would clearly
350
identify risks in the order of their severity. This would make it easier
for prospective buyers: (1) to identify conflicts of interest on the part of
sellers of securities being offered; (2) to identify clear risks involved in
the purchase of instruments being offered, while barring sellers from
hiding major risks in a thicket of verbiage detailing minor risks; and as a
result (3) to make more effective risk-benefit analyses connected with
any purchase. Moreover, the clarity of disclosure would make it easier
to state causes of action under the securities laws in the event of
material misstatements or omissions of material facts, since it would
make it more clear that such deceptions were made with the element of
scienter required for stating claims under Exchange Act section 10(b)
351
and Rule 10b-5.
Moreover, following disclosure practices required by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) for prescription drugs, the disclosure
would be required to include risk models based on experience with
similar collateral, or, in the case of complex securities, to include
experience-based risk models for the instruments in the pool on which
352
the securities were based.
A further useful borrowing from the FDA would be to require, in
disclosure dealing with high risk structures and/or collateral, or with
securities on which little or no experience-based data is available, that
issuers place such disclosure within bold black borders—the equivalent
353
Risks of this kind
of “black box” disclosure on prescription drugs.
would include concrete risks of sudden and complete or near-complete
loss of value in a security, such as that imposed by the existence of a
349. See generally Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 228, 229, 230, 239, 274); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.420–.421 (plain
language principles must be used to enhance the “readability” of a prospectus).
350. This would track present Regulation S-K, Item 503(c), 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c), now
required for securities registered under the 1933 Act.
351. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
352. Prescription Drug Advertising, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3)(iii) (2012).
353. See id. § 201.57(a)(4).
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“trigger” enabling a holder of a senior tranche to liquidate all the
collateral underlying a security on occurrence of an event such as a
354
downgrade by a credit rating agency. Securities would also be subject
to this treatment if their complexity makes it reasonably impossible for a
party other than the dealer selling them to evaluate their risks, including
securities whose collateral includes tranches of other securities or
355
derivative instruments.
Three desirable results would flow from black box disclosures. First,
it would enable state governments to enact legislation barring their
benefit funds and those of their subsidiary entities from buying direct or
indirect interests in “black boxed” securities—thereby protecting them
from pressure by beneficiaries and politicians to seek yield beyond that
356
compatible with a reasonable degree of safety. Second, it would force
sellers of securities with such characteristics to disclose them in an
unmistakable format or face liability. Third, even in cases where state
legislatures fail to act, it would focus the minds of unsophisticated
benefit fund administrators on the danger of the instruments they were
considering and the possibility of being personally subject to litigation
based on breach of fiduciary duty.
E. Regulations with New Teeth: Working with Dodd-Frank and Making
Better Use of Earlier Statutes to Protect Benefit Funds
The SEC, the CFTC, and other federal agencies have begun the task
imposed upon them by Dodd-Frank to propose regulations to prevent

354. See Gibson, supra note 138, at 17.
355. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. The European Central Bank has
gone beyond the traditional disclosure-oriented U.S. approach to securities regulation, with a
new directive that it will accept asset-backed securities as collateral for its loans to banks of
EU member states only if they are collateralized by single classes of assets that can be
documented at the level of individual loans in their underlying asset pools. See Press Release,
European Central Bank, ECB Announces Implementation of Loan-Level Data Reporting
Requirements
for
Asset-Backed
Securities
(July
6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120706.en.html; ECB to Require More
Data on ABS Starting This Year, REUTERS (July 6, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012
/07/06/ecb-assetbackedsecurities-idUSL6E8I691G20120706.
356. This would be in line with the approach adopted by the European Central Bank,
supra note 355 and accompanying text, except that it would go somewhat farther by simply
barring state instrumentalities from investing in securities lacking readily assessable risk.
Considerations of federalism require this kind of provision to be made at the state level. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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new financial crises of the kind with which we are still dealing.
Proposed regulations based on Dodd-Frank have been slow in emerging
from the agencies, however. Because the statute they interpret is
358
359
huge, combines an unrealistically large number of objectives, and is
riddled with compromises that rob it of directness and force, it does not
provide the firm foundation for regulations provided by more
straightforward statutes such as the Securities Act and the Sarbanes360
Oxley Act.
The deficiencies of the new statute and regulations based on it to
date are both substantive and procedural. Substantively, the statute
does require the removal of ratings from substantially all regulations
promulgated by federal agencies, from the SEC to the Comptroller of
361
the Currency. However, it does not establish a satisfactory substitute
for the rating process. Moreover, since there is no uniform substitute
for the rating process established by the statute and regulations, it is
inevitable that ratings will continue to be used, particularly in private
placements, by buyers of securities in evaluating their quality—and
here, Dodd-Frank not only leaves in place the prohibition of substantive
regulation of the rating process by the SEC established by CRARA, but
retains CRARA’s requirement that in formulating regulations to
enforce the limited rules that Dodd-Frank establishes for the rating
agencies, regulatory bodies such as the SEC are to construe the limits on

357. Rules of Registration of Municipal Advisers, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 3463576, 76 Fed. Reg. 824, 824 (proposed Jan. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 &
249).
358. See Levitt, supra note 33.
359. Dodd-Frank also deals with other complex issues such as the coordination of the
federal agencies jointly charged with its administration, see Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 712
(Supp. IV 2011), the regulation of previously unregulated financial entities such as hedge
funds, see id. § 619, problems associated with preventing financial institutions from becoming
“too big to fail,” see Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, pmbl, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), the
receivership of large financial institutions, see 12 U.S.C. § 5382, the public clearing of
heretofore unregulated financial instruments such as swaps, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 8301–25
(encapsalating Tittle VII Subtitle A—Regulation of Over-the-Counter Swaps Markets—of
the Dodd-Frank Act), and the protection of consumers from abuses by financial institutions.
See pmbl., 124 Stat. at 1376.
360. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7201 (2006)) (officially known as The Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act).
361. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (Supp. IV 2011).
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362

the rating agencies narrowly.
Procedurally, Dodd-Frank and the regulations based on it are far
less helpful than they appear at first sight for vindicating the rights of
benefit funds sold paper of dubious quality because Dodd-Frank looks
chiefly toward agency enforcement, and in fact raises a bar against
private actions based on misleading ratings even higher than that set by
363
As we
the PSLRA for more traditional actions for securities fraud.
have seen, even with the combined forces of federal regulatory agencies,
staffing has not been sufficient to prevent abuses under prior law. In
view of this, and since Congress has blocked the funding provisions built
364
into Dodd-Frank to expand agency staffing, it is unreasonable to
expect the agencies to be fully effective in enforcing the vastly more
complex regulatory structure that Dodd-Frank, as implemented by
regulations still being drafted, will create. This Article therefore
proposes a strategy to deploy existing resources in a way that will more
fully take advantage not only of the vast, nebulous, and untried
regulatory structure created by Dodd-Frank, but of older, more clearly
365
drafted statutes such as Securities Act securities 17(a)(2) and (3), and
366
the Advisers Act, which heretofore have been enforced exclusively by
367
the SEC.
The key to more efficient deployment of existing resources will be to
pool and make the best allocation of scarce federal and state securities
regulatory capability by establishing, pursuant to regulations to be
promulgated by the SEC, a framework under which states, whose
362. Exchange Act § 15E(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2) (2006).
363. See supra notes 283–85 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
365. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)–(3); supra note 311 and accompanying text. These
provisions authorize the SEC to order the disgorgement of funds obtained by
misrepresentation or omission of material facts, without the need to prove scienter as under
Rule 10b-5. See Complaint at 3, SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc., 11-Civ.-4206 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
SEC Litigation Release No. 22008, June 21, 2011 (noting that J.P. Morgan agreed to pay
$153.6 million to settle charges that it failed to disclose to investors, including a not-for-profit
beneficial organization, that securities pooled in a CDO sold to the investors were in part
selected by a hedge fund that held a short position in those securities).
366. See Complaint at 7, SEC v. Steffelin (S.D.N.Y. filed June 21, 2011) (No. 11-Civ.4204) (noting that employees of investment advisory firm that marketed CDO to investors
and failed to disclose that securities underlying CDO that it marketed were subject to a short
position held by a large hedge fund charged with violations of Advisers Act, with relief sought
including disgorgement of profits, injunctive relief, and civil penalties).
367. See 15 USC § 78a.
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subdivisions and agencies are the primary sponsors of the benefit funds
discussed by this Article, can work directly with federal agencies
(including not only the SEC but also the CFTC, the FDIC, and the
Comptroller of the Currency) in enforcing laws and regulations that
heretofore have been the exclusive preserve of the federal agencies.
The SEC, which has the greatest experience in bringing enforcement
actions among the federal agencies involved in this sphere, should take
the lead by creating within itself an Office of State Coordination. This
office would serve as a regular channel for state instrumentalities to the
SEC to request help by its Enforcement Division in obtaining relief for
violations of the federal securities laws. It would also provide for
standardization of SEC training for state professionals in bringing their
own securities law enforcement actions (now being done on an ad hoc
basis), and would locate and assign SEC personnel to lead teams of state
professionals in bringing enforcement actions under statutes such as the
368
Advisers Act, which may now be enforced only by the SEC.
F. Indirect Consequences of Effective Regulation
Effective regulatory reform will have healthy consequences going
beyond its direct purposes. It will, as with Dodd-Frank’s provisions
369
dealing with “too big to fail” financial institutions, help to stabilize the
nation’s overall financial system. For the benefit funds who are its
primary beneficiaries, it will not only reduce the level of risk to
beneficiaries, but, by making risk easier to estimate, it will encourage
measures to establish fund contributions at realistic levels.
Legally, it should reduce the penumbra of unnecessary deterrence of
meritorious actions by benefit funds under the federal securities laws by
370
This is
the PSLRA, and encourage bringing them in federal court.
desirable not only because the federal courts are generally more
experienced in dealing with securities law cases than the state courts, but
it will produce greater national uniformity in dealing with securities law
371
issues, and in turn make it easier for transactional lawyers in and out
of the U.S. to effectively advise their clients on minimizing the risk of

368. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979)
(Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, creates no private cause of action).
369. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5323 (Supp. IV 2011).
370. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 308–12 and accompanying text.
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litigation resulting from securities transactions.
It will also have broader effects on world financial markets. By
providing more effective deterrence against deceptive promises of safety
combined with unrealistically high yield, it will reduce the volume of
exotic securities with dubious value, and thereby help to stabilize
financial markets generally. Moreover, by reducing the availability of
exemptions from registration to securities and purchasers to those
actually intended by the drafters of the Securities Act, and compelling
more extensive and clearer disclosure even for securities exempt from
registration, it will increase the transparency of the securities markets
for financial institutions both in the U.S. and overseas.
This
transparency will help both to prevent new freeze-ups of world credit
markets such as occurred in 2008, and encourage investment in
productive activity as opposed to mere trading.
VI. CONCLUSION
The potential losses faced by government-sponsored benefit funds
from improvident investments in unconventional securities is a major
matter of concern not only for the funds’ beneficiaries, but for the credit
of the states they serve, and ultimately the U.S. economy as a whole.
This Article has focused on threading through the present politics of
deadlock to (1) aiding recovery of losses by benefit funds on pre-crisis
investments made based on misrepresentations by the peddlers of
unconventional securities; (2) multiplying the effectiveness of relatively
understaffed regulators by facilitating federal-state collaboration both
on recoveries from past fraud and prevention of future fraud; and (3)
doing so by regulations that avoid reliance on the dysfunctional political
process that now obstructs meaningful legislation.
The most effective mechanism for recovering losses on pre-crisis
benefit fund investments, particularly in view of the Supreme Court’s
increasingly restrictive views of private rights of action under the federal
372
securities laws, will be to make the best use of scarce SEC resources by
coordinating SEC enforcement efforts with state agencies under

372. In Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, the majority implied that it
continued to accept implied rights of action by non-agency persons under the securities laws
based only on its reluctance to entirely demolish the precedents establishing such rights, and
that it would therefore construe such rights as narrowly as possible. See 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302
(2011); supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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provisions of the federal securities laws that would not be available to
the states acting without SEC authority. The establishment of an Office
of State Coordination within the SEC will help to train state and
municipal lawyers in making effective use of the securities laws against
abuses already committed, help the SEC pick targets worthy of its direct
attention, draw the SEC’s attention to abuses best addressed by statutes
enforceable only by SEC action, such as the Investment Advisers Act,
and thereby not only redress past securities violations but enhance
general deterrence against such conduct in the future.
Going forward, the protection of benefit funds from improvident
investment will require the amendment of SEC rules. First, smaller and
less sophisticated funds should be taken out of the accredited investor
373
This
category that has enabled them to buy unregistered securities.
will benefit them in at least three ways: (1) it will improve disclosure to
them of the risks of their investments; (2) it will provide them with
greater liquidity for their investments; and (3) in the event that
disclosure documents concerning their investments include materially
misleading statements and omissions, particularly concerning risk, it will
enable them to obtain redress through the less stringent standards of
374
Securities Act section 11, rather than forcing them through the higher
hurdles required for actions based on Exchange Act section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.
Secondly, the SEC should make its Plain English rules mandatory
for all securities-related disclosure, including disclosure in private
placement memoranda. These rules will require risks to be stated

373. As noted above, supra notes 209–12, 238–43 and accompanying text, Dodd-Frank
section 943 and new SEC rules and forms based thereon purport to apply to unregistered as
well as registered asset-backed securities for the first time—but their coverage is limited to
requiring securitizers who have assumed contractual duties to replace or repurchase defective
assets in pools collateralizing securities to report when they have done so, a requirement that
even the SEC does not expect to have very much impact. See Disclosure for Asset-Backed
Securities Required by Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-9175 & 34-63741, 76 Fed. Reg. 4489, 4489–
51 (effective Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229, 232, 240 & 249).
374. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) to (b) (2006). Section 11(a) and (b) impose
liability on issuers, underwriters, and other persons participating in the issuance of securities
for inaccuracies in registration statement, and, by requiring them to establish their due
diligence as a defense, requires plaintiffs to merely prove negligence to recover, rather than
the higher burden of proving scienter (knowing or reckless misrepresentation) required to
establish liability in private actions under Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Supra notes
308, 329 and accompanying text.
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plainly and in order of their importance by issuers and underwriters,
who are better situated to be aware of them than even sophisticated
375
investors receiving disclosure documents, and will, by forcing issuers to
focus on risks, reduce their ability to engage in fraudulent practices such
as “lulling” investors by concealing risks in a mass of optimistic376
sounding verbiage. There is no utility in permitting issuers to conceal
risks known to them in thickets of obscure language, and even in the
real paradigm for allowing the placement of unregistered securities—
enabling investors to buy into new businesses not yet ready to go
public—clear disclosure of risk should promote rather than discourage
377
investment.
For public benefit funds, the Plain English rules will, by forcing
issuers to clearly describe inherent risks in order of severity, furnish a
more realistic way to judge investment quality than ratings. The rules
will help deter deception by making it more difficult to hide material
378
misstatements and omissions behind obfuscatory language, and easier
for plaintiffs to prove that material deceptions and omissions were made
with the scienter required for buyers to bring successful actions under
the federal securities laws. They will also make it easier for fiduciaries
running large funds that remain accredited to resist political pressures
and pressures from beneficiaries to put higher paying but risky privately
placed securities in their portfolios. This would be further amplified by
requiring issuers to “black box” major risks, which would enable state
legislatures to simply bar state instrumentalities from investing in
instruments carrying such “black box” warnings.

375. See generally Arora et al., supra note 138.
376. “Lulling” consists of communications to investors to lead them to believe that their
investments are secure, contrary to the knowledge of the communicators, and thus constitutes
an intentional violation of the federal securities laws that can give rise to criminal as well as
civil liability. See U.S. v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1976).
377. See Michael Schroeder, Caveat Entrepreneur: The Latest Stock Scams Prey on New,
Nonpublic Outfits, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1996, at 114–15 (noting that inadequate
disclosure in privately placed securities puts investors at special risk of securities fraud);
Whalen, supra note 19, at 8–10 (information asymmetry gives dealers in OTC securities a
substantial advantage over buyers and rating agencies).
378. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1976); Exchange Act
§ 10(b); 17 C.F.R. § 204.105-b (2011).

